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I. INTRODUCTION
The geographic scope of the conflict in Syria, the number and nature
of the parties involved, and the brutality of the violence have combined
to create a situation that implicates an extraordinary range of
international law issues.
The Syrian conflict is comprised of myriad non-international armed
conflicts—and arguably several international armed conflicts—being
waged by the Syrian Government, ISIS 1, as many as a thousand

* Lieutenant Colonel Christopher M. Ford, U.S. Army Judge Advocate General, is a Military
Professor at the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law at the United States Naval War
College. Thanks to Michael N. Schmitt and Sasha Radin for their thoughts and comments. The views
expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the U.S. Department of Defense or any other
government entity.
1. This organization is alternatively known as the Islamic State for Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),
the Islamic State (IS), or by its Arabic acronym, Daesh. See Maria Vultaggio, ISIL, ISIS, Islamic State,
Daesh: What’s the Difference, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES (Nov. 16, 2015)
http://www.ibtimes.com/isil-isis-islamic-state-daesh-whats-difference-2187131.
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organized armed groups, 2 several dozen States, 3 and more than ten
thousand foreign fighters. 4 This has resulted in at least 450,000 dead,5
more than four-and-a-half-million refugees, 6 and six-and-a-half-million
internally displaced Syrians. 7 The conflict has spawned innumerable
war crimes, 8 including daily direct attacks on civilians, 9 multiple uses of
chemical weapons, 10 and countless indiscriminate attacks using
artillery, 11 cluster munitions, 12 barrel bombs13 and fuel-air bombs. 14
State involvement is an issue of singular complexity. Participant
States are conducting operations in Syria based on a variety of
arguments, including individual self-defense, collective self-defense,
consent, and (arguably) humanitarian intervention. 15 Some States have
relied on a single legal basis for their actions in Syria, while others cite
multiple bases. 16
Depending on the State, the nature of their
involvement ranges from logistical support, to arming and training

2. Eric Schmitt & Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Intelligence Official Says Syrian War Could Last for
Years, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 20, 2013) http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/world/middleeast/usintelligence-official-says-syrian-war-could-last-for-years.html?_r=0 (the U.S. Defense Intelligence
Agency estimates as many as 1,200 small groups).
3. The Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/seci/
(last visited Aug. 30, 2016).
4. Thomas Hegghammer, The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of
Jihad, INT’L SECURITY, Winter 2010/11 at 53, 53.
5. Priyanka Boghani, A Staggering New Death Toll for Syria’s War—470,000, FRONTLINE
(Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/a-staggering-new-death-toll-for-syrias-war470000/.
6. Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS,
http://www.unocha.org/syria (last visited Aug. 30, 2016).
7. Id.
8. See generally, U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HCR/S-17/2/Add.1 (Nov. 23, 2011)
[hereinafter Report 1]; U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/69 (Feb. 22, 2012)
[hereinafter Report 2]; U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/50 (Aug. 16, 2012)
[hereinafter Report 3]; U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/59 (Feb. 5, 2013)
[hereinafter Report 4]; U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/58 (Jul. 18, 2013)
[hereinafter Report 5].
9. See Report 1, supra note 8; Report 2, supra note 8; Report 3, supra note 8; Report 4, supra
note 8; Report 5, supra note 8.
10. See id.
11. See generally, Report 3, supra note 8.
12. Id.
13. See generally, Report 4, supra note 8, 39.
14. See generally, Report 2, supra note 8.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part III.
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proxy forces, to direct action on the ground and in the air. 17
The conflict in Syria presents an opportunity to consider the
international law issues both in the context of Syria and more broadly
with regards to all armed conflicts. After a review of the origins of the
conflict, this article is divided into two broad parts: issues arising in the
jus ad bellum and those arising in jus in bello. In the first part, the
article considers questions regarding the use of force in Syria, including
issues arising from the arming and training of proxies. This part will
focus largely on the actions of the United States, as its activities have
implicated many of the topics addressed in this section. The second part
addresses issues of conflict classification, the conduct of hostilities, the
nature of foreign fighters, and the implications of a cease-fire.
II. BACKGROUND
The conflict finds its origins in the brutal repression of antigovernment demonstrations in early 2011. The first protests occurred in
February following the arrest and alleged torture of several teenagers
who had painted revolutionary slogans on the wall of their school in the
southern city of Dar’a. 18 Within weeks, the Syrian government
responded with a violent crackdown utilizing both internal security
forces and the military. 19 By May, military operations had commenced
in a number of other cities, including Baniyas, Homs, Ar Rastan, and the
outskirts of Damascus. 20 In response, a number of opposition groups
began forming throughout the country. 21
While violence between the government and opposition forces
continued in southern Syria, Syrians who had fled to Turkey began
17. See Syria Crisis: Where Key Countries Stand, BBC NEWS (Oct. 30, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23849587.
18. Guide: Syria Crisis, BBC NEWS (Apr. 9, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middleeast-13855203 (reporting 14 students were arrested after painting the slogan “The People Want to
Downfall of the Regime”).
19. Statement by the Deputy High Commissioner for the Human Rights Council Special Session
on Syria, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Apr. 29, 2011),
http://newsarchive.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10968&LangID=E
(By the end of April, 2011 “[t]anks have been deployed and shelled densely-populated areas. The
delivery of food has been impeded. Access to electricity has been cut. And transportation systems have
been shut down. There have been reports of snipers firing on persons attempting to assist the injured or
remove dead bodies from public areas.”).
20. Syria: Tanks “Deploy Around Rastan” After Protests, BBC NEWS (May 4, 2011),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-13279262.
21. ELIZABETH O’BAGY, INSTIT. FOR THE STUDY OF WAR, MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 9:
THE FREE SYRIAN ARMY (Mar. 2013), http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The-FreeSyrian-Army-24MAR.pdf; Liam Stack, In Slap at Syria, Turkey Shelters Anti-Assad Fighters, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/28/world/europe/turkey-is-shelteringantigovernment-syrian-militia.html.
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coalescing into groups seeking to provide political structure and support
to the opposition movement. In July, defectors from the Syrian military
formed the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in a refugee camp in Turkey. 22
Less than a month later, the Syrian National Council, which would later
become the most prominent opposition group, was established in
Istanbul. 23
The violence continued to spread through the summer of 2011,
escalating to the point that, on August 3, the United Nations Security
Council issued a presidential statement expressing “its grave concern at
the deteriorating situation in Syria,” condemning the widespread
violations of human rights and the Syrian authorities’ use of force
against civilians by, and calling on “the Syrian authorities to alleviate
the humanitarian situation.” 24
The United Nations Human Rights Council took the additional step of
establishing the Commission of Inquiry under the auspices of the UN
Human Rights Council in September. 25 The Commission’s mandate is
to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights
law . . . in . . . Syria[], . . . to establish the facts and circumstances
that may amount to such violations and of the crimes perpetrated
and, where possible, to identify those responsible with a view of
ensuring that perpetrators of violations, including those that may
constitute crimes against humanity, are held accountable. 26
By late 2011, the FSA counted twenty-two loosely organized separate
military forces as subordinate units fighting in a very loose
organization, 27 and by November, the Syrian government had
commenced military operations throughout the country. 28 The Syrian
government’s crackdown was so intense that, in the same month, the
Arab League took the extraordinary step of suspending Syria’s

22. JOSEPH HOLLIDAY, INST. FOR THE STUDY OF WAR, MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 3:
SYRIA’S
ARMED
OPPOSITION
14
(Mar.
2012),
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Syrias_Armed_Opposition.pdf.
23. Louise Arimatsu & Mohbuba Choudhury, The Legal Classification of the Armed Conflicts in
HOUSE,
10
(Mar.
2014),
Syria,
Yemen,
and
Libya,
CHATHAM
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/home/chatham/public_html/sites/default/files/2
0140300ClassificationConflictsArimatsuChoudhury1.pdf.
24. Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2011/16 (Aug. 3,
2011).
25. Report 1, supra note 8, at 4.
26. Id.
27. Report 1, supra note 8, at 15.
28. Id. at 10 (this includes operations in Dar’a, Homs, Hama, Dayr Az Zawr, Damascus,
Alqaseer, Bab Amr, Bab Al Sibaa, Bab Hood, and Karm Al Zaitoon).
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membership. 29 Near the same time, the Human Rights Council, noting
that 3,500 civilians had been killed by State forces since March,
concluded, “The substantial body of evidence gathered by the
commission indicates that . . . gross violations of human rights have
been committed by Syrian military and security forces since the
beginning of the protests.” 30
By January 2012 the al-Nusra Front (also known as al-Qaeda in the
Levant or Jabhat al-Nusra) began operations against the Syrian
government. 31 In March, the FSA announced the establishment of the
Joint Military Command of the Syrian Revolution and creation of “local
military councils” in various cities. 32 The intent of the reorganization
was to solidify the structure of the FSA. 33
In its third report released in August, the Commission of Inquiry
documented “corroborated accounts of indiscriminate shelling” in cities
throughout Syria, 34 and further detailed tactics being employed by the
Syrian government:
Most unlawful killings occurred in the context of attacks against
the strongholds of anti-Government armed groups. According to
the most prominent pattern, attacks began with a blockade of the
area and shelling, followed by an assault by ground forces,
including special forces and Shabbiha. Snipers were used
extensively. On securing the area, Government forces undertook
house-to-house searches. Defectors, activists and fighting-age
men were systematically sought out during these operations.
Wounded or captured anti-Government fighters were executed. In
some cases, family members of fighters, defectors and activists, as

29. Neil MacFarquhar, Arab League Votes to Suspend Syria Over Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/world/middleeast/arab-league-votes-to-suspend-syriaover-its-crackdown-on-protesters.html (eighteen of the twenty-two members voted to suspend their
membership; only Yemen and Lebanon opposed the action).
30. Report 1, supra note 8, at 8.
31. Despite their affiliation with al-Qaeda, their focus thus far has been on Assad rather than the
west. Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri has specifically directed the al-Nusra Front to focus
operations on Syria and cease operations against the west. See Charles Lister, An Internal Struggle: Al
Qaeda’s Syrian Affiliate is Grappling with its Identity, WORLD REPORT (May 31, 2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/charles-lister/an-internal-struggle-al-q_b_7479730.html.
32. Report 3, supra note 8, at 61.
33. O’BAGY, supra note 21. In its second report, the United Nations Independent Commission
of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (Commission of Inquiry) used the term FSA “to refer to any
local armed group whose members identify themselves as belonging to the FSA, without this necessarily
implying that the group has been recognized by the FSA leadership or obeys the command of the FSA
leadership abroad.” Report 2, supra note 8, at 6. The Commission of Inquiry found the FSA lacked the
requisite organization to trigger application of the law of armed conflict. Id.
34. Report 3, supra note 8, at 17.
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well. 35
This report also documented both the first use of chemical weapons
by the Syrian government in September, 36 and the involvement of progovernment militias (the Shabbiha). 37
As documented by the
Commission of Inquiry, the Shabbiha have been used to commit many
of the ethnically charged war crimes. 38 By the end of the year, the FSA
had moved their headquarters from Turkey to northern Syria 39 and
convened a large meeting in Antalya, Turkey to create a unified
command and select new leadership. 40
The conflict widened throughout 2013. The Commission’s fourth
report, dated February 5, 2013, reported Hezbollah involvement, 41 and
the use of chemical weapons in four additional attacks in 2013. 42 Early
2013 also marked the initiation of action by ISIS within Syria. 43 At one
point, ISIS controlled more than 34,000 square miles of territory in
Syria and Iraq in 2014, and counted an estimated 30,000 as members. 44
Between 2013 and 2015 the violence steadily escalated. In this
period there have been several events of particular importance to the
shape of the conflict. First, on the night of May 15, 2015, U.S. special
operations executed a raid in al-Amr in eastern Syria designed to capture
35. Id. at 12.
36. Id. at 21.
37. Id. at 8. “Shabbiha” is also often romanized “Shabiha.”
38. Report 3, supra note 8, at 1 (“The Shabbiha were identified as perpetrators of many of the
crimes described in the present report.”).
39. Anne Barnard & Hania Mourtada, Rebels Announce Move of Headquarters From Turkey to
“Liberated”
Syria
Territory,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
22,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/23/world/middleeast/rebels-move-command-from-turkey-tosyria.html.
40. Bassem Morue & Ben Hubbard, Syria Rebels Get New Leadership in Bid to Unite, AP (Dec.
8,
2012),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/syrian-rebels-create-new-unified-military-command
(“Disorganization has bedeviled Syria’s rebel movement since its birth late last year . . . . [T]he
movement has never actually been an army.”); Syrian Rebels Elect Head of New Military Command,
(Dec.
8,
2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-rebelsREUTERS
idUSBRE8B70AJ20121208.
41. Report 4, supra note 8, at 57; see also MARISA SULLIVAN, INSTIT. FOR THE STUDY OF WAR,
MIDDLE
EAST
SECURITY
REPORT
19:
HEZBOLLAH
IN
SYRIA
(Apr.
2014),
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Hezbollah_Sullivan_FINAL.pdf.
42. Report 5, supra note 8, at 21 (“on Khan Al-Asal (Aleppo), on 19 March; Uteibah
(Damascus) on 19 March; Sheikh Maqsood neighbourhood (Aleppo) on 13 April; and Saraqib (Idlib),
on 29 April”).
43. Report 4, supra note 8, at 12. Other reports show ISIS initiating operations in Syria in
March 2013. See Umberto Bacchi, ISIS: Timeline of the Islamic State, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jun. 29,
2015), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/isis-timeline-islamic-state-1508465.
As is unfortunately well
understood at this point, ISIS “is a transnational Sunni Islamist insurgent and terrorist group that has
seized areas of Iraq and Syria since 2013, threatening the wider region.” Christopher M. Blanchard et.
al, The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy, CONG. RES. SERV. (Jun. 11, 2015).
44. Report 4, supra note 8, at 12.
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Abu Sayyaf, a senior leader in ISIS. 45 This is, to date, one of only two
publically acknowledged U.S. military operations on the ground in
Syria. Second, on September 23, 2014, the U.S.-led coalition began
airstrikes within Syria. 46 Third, Russia began airstrikes in Syria on
September 30, 2015, 47 and Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet
allegedly over Turkish airspace on November 24, 2015.48 Finally,
several cease-fires have taken effect and fallen apart. 49
III. JUS AD BELLUM
A. Use of Force
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the “threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.” 50 The prohibition on the use of force is considered a
preemptory norm. 51 There are two charter-based exceptions—U.N.
Security Council action pursuant to Articles 39 and 42 of the charter,
and self-defense pursuant to Article 51.52
Extra-charter based
exceptions include consent, and (arguably) humanitarian intervention.
Where a State acts in self-defense or with the consent of the territorial
State, the basis of action provides a legal justification for taking actions
45. Statement by NSC Spokesperson Bernadette Meehan on Counter-ISIL Operation in Syria,
WHITE HOUSE OFF. PRESS SECRETARY (May 16, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/05/16/statement-nsc-spokesperson-bernadette-meehan-counter-isil-operation-sy-1.
46. President Barack Obama, Statement by the President: Airstrikes in Syria (Sept. 23, 2014),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/statement-president-airstrikes-syria.
47. Patrick J. McDonnell, W.J. Hennigan & Nabith Bulos, Russia Launches Airstrikes in Syria
TIMES
(Sep.
30,
2015),
amid
U.S.
Concern
about
Targets,
L.A.
http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-kremlin-oks-troops-20150930-story.html.
48. Tulay Karadeniz & Maria Kiselyova, Turkey Downs Russian Warplane Near Syria Border,
Putin Warns of “Serious Consequences,” REUTERS (Nov. 25, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/usmideast-crisis-syria-turkey-idUSKBN0TD0IR20151124.
49. The first cease-fire was orchestrated by the U.S. and Russia as co-chairs of the “International
Syria Support Group;” a separate, parallel peace process has been championed by UN Special Envoy for
Syria, Staffan de Mistura. See Statement of the International Syria Support Group, EUROPEAN UNION
(Nov. 14, 2015), http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/151114_03_en.htm; Tom Miles et. al., U.N.
Announces Start of Syria Peace Talks as Government Troops Advance, REUTERS (Feb. 1, 2016),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-idUSKCN0VA2OT.
50. Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. of the Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J.
168, ¶ 35 (Dec. 19, 2005) [hereinafter Armed Activities].
51. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J.
226, ¶ 190 (June 27, 1986) [hereinafter Nicaragua]; see also Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with
Commentaries 1966, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 187, 247, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add. 1
[hereinafter Articles] (“[T]he law of the Charter concerning the prohibition of the use of force in itself
constitutes a conspicuous example of a rule in international law having the character of jus cogens.”).
52. U.N. Charter art. 39, 42.
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that would otherwise violate Article 2(4). The basis of action also
provides legal justification to the principle of customary international
law that requires “every State to respect the territorial sovereignty of
others.” 53
1. Exceptions to the Prohibition
a. Self-Defense
Article 51 of the UN Charter provides that States have an “inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs.” 54 Self-defense is the most commonly invoked grounds for
action in Syria. This section will first consider self-defense generally,
then collective self-defense, then individual self-defense against nonState actors.
Beyond the requirement of an armed attack, the exercise of selfdefense (whether individual or collective) must be necessary, 55
proportional, 56 and immediate. 57 To be necessary, the use of force must
be required “because no practicable alternative means of redress is
within [the State’s] reach.” 58 Proportionality, in turn, requires the force
used by the aggrieved State to be no more than necessary to neutralize
the attack and prevent future attacks. 59 Immediacy requires the “victim
state act only within the ‘window of opportunity,’ that is, the period
within which the defensive response must be launched to be effective.” 60

53. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 213.
54. U.N. Charter, art. 51.
55. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 94 (“[W]hether the response to the [armed] attack is lawful
depends on observance of the criteria of the necessity and the proportionality of the measures taken in
self-defence.”); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 43 (Nov. 6, 2003) (“[T]he criteria of
necessity and proportionality must be observed if a measure is to be qualified as self-defence.”).
56. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 94; Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 198 (Nov.
6, 2003).
57. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE 230 (5th ed. 2011) (“In fact, the
two conditions of necessity and proportionality are accompanied by a third condition of immediacy.
Immediacy has not been expressly recognized by the Court, but customary international law fully
confirms its existence.”) (citations omitted); see also THE HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
MILITARY OPERATIONS 196 (Terry D. Gill & Dieter Fleck eds. 2010) [hereinafter Gill & Fleck] (“[T]he
exercise of self-defense is also subject to the well-established conditions of necessity, proportionality,
and immediacy.”).
58. DINSTEIN, supra note 57, at 208.
59. Louise Arimatsu & Michael N. Schmitt, Attacking “Islamic State” and the Khorasan Group:
Surveying the International Law Landscape, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. BULL. 1, 16 (2014).
60. Mary Ellen O’Connell & Michael N. Schmitt, International Law and the Use of Drones 10,
HOUSE
(Oct.
21,
2010),
CHATHAM
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/International%20Law/il21101
0drones.pdf.
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To date, neither Iraq nor Syria is known to have acted outside its
respective territory. Rather, both States have invoked their right to selfdefense and invited third-party States to act in collective self-defense on
their behalf. 61 The United States,62 France, 63 United Kingdom,64
Germany, 65 and Australia 66 have based their operations in Syria against
ISIS for the collective self-defense of Iraq. 67
The right to collective self-defense can be found in Article 51, which
enshrines “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense.”68
This provision of Article 51 was included at the request of Latin
American countries that wished to affirm the legality of their regional
collective security organizations, 69 and is now regarded as a matter of
customary international law. 70 Collective self-defense requires the
victim State to form the view that it has been subject to an attack and
61. Permanent Rep. of Iraq to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 20, 2014 from Permanent Rep. of Iraq
to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2014/691 (Sept.
22, 2014) (“ISIL has established a safe haven outside Iraq’s borders that is a direct threat to the security
of our people and territory . . . . The presence of this safe haven has made our borders impossible to
defend and exposed our citizens to the threat of terrorist attacks . . . . It is for these reasons that we, in
accordance with international law and the relevant bilateral and multilateral agreements, and with due
regard for complete national sovereignty and the Constitution, have requested the United States of
America to lead international efforts to strike ISIL sites and military strongholds, with our express
consent.”).
62. Permanent Rep. of the United States of America to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 23, 2014
from the Permanent Rep. of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2014/695 (Sept. 23, 2014) (“ISIL and other terrorist groups in Syria are
a threat not only to Iraq, but also to many other countries, including the United States and our partners in
the region and beyond. States must be able to defend themselves, in accordance with the inherent right
of individual and collective self-defence, as reflected in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations
. . . .”).
63. Permanent Representative of France to the U.N., Identical letters dated Sept. 8, 2015 from
the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/745 (Sept. 9, 2015).
64. Permanent Rep. of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the U.N.,
Letter dated Dec. 3, 2015 from the Permanent Rep. of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2015/928 (Dec. 3, 2015).
65. Charge d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Germany to the U.N., Letter dated Dec.
10, 2015 from the Charge d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/946 (Dec. 10, 2015).
66. Permanent Rep. of Australia to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 9, 2015 from the Permanent Rep.
of Australia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2015/693 (Sept. 9, 2015).
67. Note that Israel has acknowledged conducting operations in Syria “to prevent weapons from
being
delivered
to
Israel’s
enemies.”
Tia Goldenberg, Netanyahu Says Israel Acts in Syria “From Time to Time,” AP (Dec. 1, 2015),
https://www.yahoo.com/news/netanyahu-says-israel-acts-syria-time-time-145917303.html?ref=gs.
68. U.N. Charter, art. 51.
69. T.D. Gill, The Temporal Dimension of Self-Defence: Anticipation, Pre-emption, Prevention
and Immediacy, 11 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 361, 363 (2006).
70. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 226, ¶¶ 193-94.
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actually request assistance from other States. 71 The assisting State too
has the obligation to independently verify that its actions comply with
the requirements for self-defense. Interestingly, as Claus Kreß points
out, this is perhaps only the second time in history—the other being
post-9/11—that collective self-defense has been invoked against an
attack from a non-State actor. 72
To act in accordance with Article 51, there must first be an “armed
attack” on the State invoking the right to self-defense. In Nicaragua, the
International Court of Justice defined “armed attack” to include both
actions by “regular armed forces” as well as “the sending by or on
behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries,
which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity
as to amount to an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces.” 73
The Court further held that operations must achieve sufficient “scale
and effect” so as to distinguish them from “a mere frontier incident.”74
The “scale and effect” test is also commonly used to describe the trigger
for acts of violence committed by organized armed groups acting on
behalf of a State against another State. 75
While it is clear that ISIS operations meet the scale and effects
condition for an armed attack, the group has not been sent “by or on
behalf of a State.” This begs the question of whether a State can
respond in self-defense to a non-State actor acting on its own accord.
The right of a State to exercise self-defense against such a group is a
matter of some debate. 76
The traditional view supported by
International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisprudence holds that the Article
51 right to self-defense applies only “in the case of an armed attack by
one State against another State.” 77 Since 9/11, however, scholarship and
71. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 199 (concluding that the requirement of a request by the State
which is the victim of the alleged attack is additional to the requirement that such a State should have
declared itself to have been attacked).
72. Claus Kreß, The Fine Line Between Collective Self-Defense and Intervention by Invitation:
Reflections on the Use of Force against ‘IS’ in Syria, JUST SEC. (Feb. 17, 2015),
https://www.justsecurity.org/20118/claus-kreb-force-isil-syria/ (“In the case of the use of force against
the Islamic State in Syria, this right has, again for the first time I believe, acquired the center stage of
State practice.”); U.N. Charter, art. 51.
73. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 195 (citations omitted).
74. Id. Yoram Dinstein has characterized this level of force as the “use of force producing (or
liable to produce) serious consequences, epitomized by territorial intrusions, human casualties or
considerable destruction of property.” DINSTEIN, supra note 57.
75. Gill & Fleck, supra note 57, at 190 (“Additionally, an armed attack can be carried out by an
organized armed group which is capable of mounting an armed attack carried out by a State.”).
76. See, e.g., Monica Hakimi, Defensive Force Against Non-State Actors: The State of Play, 91
INT’L L. STUD. 1 (2015) (describing the debate regarding the application of Article 51 to actions by nonState affiliated organized armed groups).
77. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 139 (July 9, 2004). But cf., Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins
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State practice has evolved to allow for defensive force in response to
acts by a non-State actor. 78
In the case at hand, the United States has further argued an individual
right to self-defense with regards to “military actions in Syria against alQaida elements in Syria known as the Khorasan Group to address
terrorist threats that they pose to the United States and our partners and
allies.” 79 The UK too, on at least one occasion, has acted in Syria in
individual self-defense. 80
The United States claims a right to individual self-defense as against
the Khorasan Group and the al-Nusra Front. The United States,
however, has not been the subject of an armed attack from the Khorasan
Group or the al-Nusra Front. That said, the al-Nusra Front—and by
extension, the Khorasan Group—is an affiliate of al-Qaeda, an
organized armed group that has conducted armed attacks against the
United States with sufficient scale and effects to trigger the right of selfdefense. With sufficient linkage between the groups, the U.S. has a
valid basis for individual self-defense as to the Khorasan Group and alNusra Front in Syria.
The United States has argued that it may act in self-defense of Iraq in
Syria, where Syria is “unwilling or unable to prevent the use of its

¶ 33 (“There is, with respect, nothing in the text of Article 51 that thus stipulates that self-defense is
available only when an armed attack is made by a State”); see also Armed Activities, supra note 50,
¶ 146 (finding the attack on Uganda was not attributable to the Democratic Republic of Congo and that
“the legal and factual circumstances for the exercise of the right of self-defense by Uganda against the
DRC were not present”).
78. See Arimatsu & Schmitt, supra note 59 (providing a comprehensive discussion on the
debate); see also CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 160–61 (2nd ed.
2004) (noting that the US and Israel had on multiple occasions prior to 9/11 “invoked Article 51 to
justify the use of force in response to terrorist attacks on nationals abroad.”); Ruth Wedgwood,
Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against Bin Laden, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 559, 565 (1999) (“If a
host country permits the use of its territory as a staging area for terrorist attacks when it could shut those
operations down, and refuses requests to take action, the host government cannot expect to insulate its
territory against measures of self-defense.”); DINSTEIN, supra note 57, 268–70; Kreß, supra note 72
(“[T]he wording of Article 51 of the UN Charter supports the idea, neither systematic nor teleological
considerations contradict it and the pre-Charter history of self-defense claims in cases of non-State
armed attacks certainly goes back to the beginning of the 19th century.”).
79. Permanent Rep. of the United States of America to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 23, 2014
from the Permanent Rep. of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2014/695 (Sept. 23, 2014).
80. Permanent Rep. of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the U.N.,
Letter dated Sept. 7, 2015 from the Permanent Rep. of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2015/688 (Sept. 8, 2015) (“On 21 August 2015, armed forces of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland carried out a precision air strike against an ISIL vehicle in which a target known to
be actively engaged in planning and directing imminent armed attacks against the United Kingdom was
travelling. This air strike was a necessary and proportionate exercise of the individual right of selfdefence of the United Kingdom.”).
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territory” by ISIS for attacks into Iraq. 81 This position appears to have
been expressly endorsed by Australia 82 and Turkey 83, and implicitly
endorsed by the United Kingdom, 84 France 85 and Iraq. 86 The “unwilling
and unable” 87 argument is not without criticism and has been the subject

81. Permanent Rep. of the United States of America to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 23, 2014
from the Permanent Rep. of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2014/695 (Sept. 23, 2014).
82. Permanent Rep. of Australia to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 9, 2015 from the Permanent Rep.
of Australia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2015/693 (Sept. 9, 2015) (“The Government of Syria has, by its failure to constrain attacks upon Iraqi
territory originating from ISIL bases within Syria, demonstrated that it is unwilling or unable to prevent
those attacks . . . . In response to the request for assistance by the Government of Iraq, Australia is
therefore undertaking necessary and proportionate military operations against ISIL in Syria in the
exercise of the collective self-defence of Iraq.”).
83. Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the U.N., Letter dayed July 24,
2015 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc S/2015/563 (July 24, 2015) (“It is apparent
that the regime in Syria is neither capable of nor willing to prevent these threats emanating from its
territory, which clearly imperil the security of Turkey and the safety of its nationals . . .Individual and
collective self-defence is our inherent right under international law, as reflected in Article 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations.”).
84. Permanent Rep. of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the U.N.,
Identical letters dated Nov. 25, 2014 from the Permanent Rep. of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2014/851 (Nov. 26, 2014) (“[T]he United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland is taking measures in support of the collective self-defence of Iraq . . . by striking ISIL
sites and military strongholds in Syria, as necessary and proportionate measures.”); see also 20 July
2015,
Parl
Deb
HC
(2015)
col.
1199
(UK),
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmhansrd/cm150720/debtext/150720-0001.htm.
(Michael Fallon, Secretary of State for Defence, Statement to Parliament: “Actions by American,
Canadian and other forces in Syria are legal because they contribute to the collective self-defence of the
legitimate Government of Iraq where the Government of Syria are unwilling and unable to deal with
ISIL at its source in northern Syria.”).
85. Permanent Representative of France to the U.N., Identical letters dated Sept. 8, 2015 from
the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/745 (Sept. 9, 2015) (“In accordance with
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, France has taken actions involving the participation of
military aircraft in response to attacks carried out by ISIL from the territory of the Syrian Arab
Republic.”).
86. Permanent Rep. of Iraq to the U.N., Annex to Letter dated Sept. 20, 2014 from Permanent
Rep. of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2014/691 (Sept. 22, 2014) (“ISIL has established a safe haven outside Iraq’s borders that is a direct
threat to the security of our people and territory . . . . The presence of this safe haven has made our
borders impossible to defend and exposed our citizens to the threat of terrorist attacks . . . . It is for
these reasons that we, in accordance with international law and the relevant bilateral and multilateral
agreements, and with due regard for complete national sovereignty and the Constitution, have requested
the United States of America to lead international efforts to strike ISIL sites and military strongholds,
with our express consent.”).
87. OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL
1049 (2015) [hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL] (“In addition, the United States has expressed
the view that consent is not required when the territorial State is unwilling or unable to prevent its
territory from being used by non-State armed groups as a base for launching attacks.”).
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of much debate among scholars. 88
There are two broad views. The first view, as described by Michael
Schmitt and Louise Arimatsu, holds that “the territory of the States
where the non-State actors are located is inviolable absent an exception
that applies to the State itself.” 89 The competing view argues that
sovereignty is not inviolable and must be balanced against the right to
self-defense. 90
The second view is reflected in the Lotus case, where Justice John
Bassett Moore, writing for the dissent in the Permanent Court of
International Justice, argued that “[i]t is well settled that a State is bound
to use due diligence to prevent the commission within its dominions of
criminal acts against another nation or its people.” 91 In the Corfu
Channel case, the ICJ unequivocally endorsed Moore’s dissent in Lotus,
holding that a State has an obligation “not to allow knowingly its
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.” 92 This
principle, of course, would extend to knowingly allowing your territory
to be used by an organized armed group that is conducting military
attacks on another State. In this instance, Syria is aware—and cannot
prevent—armed attacks by ISIS from their territory into Iraq.
ISIS has made clear its desire to control and administer territory
within Iraq. They have repeatedly and unequivocally resisted attempts
for a negotiated settlement. Further, the military actions from both Iraq
and Syria have yet to neutralize the threat. Given this, it would appear
that U.S. action in Syria is necessary, proportional, and immediate.
b. Consent
The Articles of State Responsibility reflect the widespread consensus
that “[v]alid consent by a State to the commission of a given act by
another State precludes the wrongfulness of that act in relation to the
former State to the extent that the act remains within the limits of that
88. See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, The Absence of Practice Supporting the “Unwilling or Unable”
Test, OPINIO JURIS (Feb. 17, 2015), http://opiniojuris.org/2015/02/17/unable-unwilling-test-unstoppablescholarly-imagination/. For an excellent and comprehensive article on the “Unwilling or Unable” test,
see Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial SelfDefense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483 (2012).
89. Arimatsu & Schmitt, supra note 59, at 16 n.64 (citing IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 275–278 (1963)).
90. Id. at 5 n.15 (citing Corfu Channel case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 43 (Apr. 9, 1949)
(individual opinion of Judge Alvarez)); see also U.N. Permanent Rep. of the United States of America
to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 23, 2014 from the Permanent Rep. of the United States of America to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2014/695 (Sept. 23, 2014).
91. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 88 (Sept. 7, 1927) (Moore, J.,
dissenting) (citing United States v. Arizona, 120 U.S. 479 (1887)).
92. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9, 1949).
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consent.” 93 The United States and others are acting with the consent of
Iraq within the territory of Iraq. 94 Russia, conversely, appears to be
acting with the consent of Syria.
Given the substantial potential for abuse, the concept of consent is not
without limits. 95 There are several generally accepted criteria regarding
the validity of consent. First, consent must be freely given; it cannot be
the product of coercion, trickery, or force. 96 Second, consent must be
secured “by a State in advance or even at the time it is occurring” 97 and
may be revoked by the consenting State at any time. 98 Third, the
consent must be “actually expressed.” 99 Finally, consent must be given
by an agent with authority to give consent on behalf of the State. 100
As opposed to Iraq, Syria has not formally consented to the use of
force by any State except Russia on its territory. Nevertheless, it is
conceivable that the U.S. and its coalition partners are acting in Syria
with the implicit consent of the Syrian government. Whether the U.S.
and its coalition partners are acting in Syria with consent turns on the
third criterion: the requirement that consent be “actually expressed.”101
Here “actually” should not be read to mean “explicitly.” Consent need
not take a particular form, nor must it be in writing. 102 Consent can be
implicit so long as it is clearly established. 103
The ICJ has also endorsed the concept that consent can be informal, if
93. Mahmoud Mohmed Al-Naman (Rapporteur), Report of the International Law Commission
on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/589 10 (Nov. 26, 2001); see also ANTONIO
CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 369 (2d ed. 2005) (“[B]y explicit consent a State may authorize the use
of force on its territory whenever, being the object of an ‘armed attack’, it resorts to individual selfdefence and in addition authorizes a third State to assist in ‘collective self-defence.’”).
94. Permanent Rep. of Iraq to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 20, 2014 from Permanent Rep. of Iraq
to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2014/691 (Sept.
22, 2014) (“[W]e . . . have requested the United States of America to lead international efforts to strike
ISIL sites and military strongholds, with our express consent.”).
95. DINSTEIN, supra note 57, at 121 (“A perennial problem relating to consent is the possibility
of abuse.”); see also Ashley S. Deeks, Consent to the Use of Force and International Law Supremacy,
54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2013).
96. Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L.
Comm’n 31, 73, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2).
97. Id.
98. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 226; Armed Activities, supra note 50.
99. Articles on Responsibility, supra note 96 (“Consent must be freely given and clearly
established. It must be actually expressed by the State rather than merely presumed on the basis that the
State would have consented if it had been asked.”); see also CASSESE, supra note 93, at 370 (“[C]onsent
must be freely given . . . it must be real as opposed to merely ‘apparent.’”).
100. Articles on Responsibility, supra note 96.
101. Id.
102. State Responsibility, [1979] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1, 35, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SERA/1979/Add.l (Part 1) (“In the first place, we should emphasize that the consent in question
must have been validly expressed . . . . No special condition as to form is required for its expression
. . . .”).
103. Id. (“[C]onsent can be expressed or tacit, explicit or implicit, provided, however, that it is
clearly established.”).
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not implicit. In the Armed Activities case, the ICJ considered the
Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) objection to the presence of
Ugandan troops in its territory. 104 The court found that consent existed
despite the lack of formal agreement requesting or consenting to the
Ugandan troops. 105 The court found support for consent in two places:
[B]oth the absence of any objection to the presence of Ugandan
troops in the DRC in the preceding months, and the practice
subsequent to the signing of the Protocol, support the view that the
continued presence as before of Ugandan troops would be
permitted by the DRC by virtue of the Protocol. 106
Presently, Syria has neither formally requested nor publically
consented to U.S. action in its country. To the contrary, the Syrian
Foreign Minister remarked that “[a]ny strike which is not co-ordinated
with the government will be considered as aggression.” 107 More
importantly, Syria has filed two letters with the President of Security
Council which address use of force within Syria. Both letters are worth
brief consideration.
The first letter dated September 21, 2015, declares that “[i]f any State
invokes the excuse of counter-terrorism in order to be present on Syrian
territory without the consent of the Syrian Government, whether on the
country’s land or in its airspace or territorial waters, its actions shall be
considered a violation of Syrian sovereignty.” 108 By a strict reading of
this sentence, only actions that “invoke the excuse of counter-terrorism”
would trigger a requirement for consent. It is unclear why Syria would
limit its objection to just “counter-terror” actions. The letter also
inexplicably does not reference the United States, though it does
reference “States” generally, and the United Kingdom, Australia, and
France specifically. 109 To fully understand this letter, it should be read
104. Armed Activities, supra note 50.
105. Id. ¶¶ 45–46; see also Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and
Bahrain, Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Qatar v. Bahr.), Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. 112, ¶¶ 21–30 (July 1,
1994) (noting that the Minutes from meetings between Qatar and Bahrain “do not merely give an
account of discussions and summarize points of agreement and disagreement. They enumerate the
commitments to which the Parties have consented. They thus create rights and obligations in
international law for the Parties. They constitute an international agreement.”).
106. Armed Activities, supra note 50, at 197.
107. Syria Offers to Help Fight ISIS but Warns Against Unilateral Air Strikes, GUARDIAN (Aug.
26, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/26/syria-offers-to-help-fight-isis-but-warnsagainst-unilateral-air-strikes.
108. Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the U.N., Identical letters dated
Sept. 17, 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/719
(Sep. 21, 2015).
109. Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the U.N., Identical letters dated
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in conjunction with the second letter.
The second letter dated a day later, states that “The United States,
Britain, France, Canada and Australia have sought to justify their
intervention in Syria by citing the fight against ISIL. They have
invoked Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, but have not
consulted with the Syrian Government.” 110 Interestingly here the letter
refers not to “consent” but rather to “consultation.” Conceivably, this
could be read as Syria not demanding that they consent, but only that
other countries “consult” with them before force is used in Syria. A
more accurate and fair reading would be to read the two letters together
and conclude that Syria is in fact expressing their lack of consent to the
use of force on their territory without—at minimum—their consultation
on the matter. Reading the letters together would also remove any doubt
as to whether the first letter applied to the United States.
Despite Syria’s apparent objection to the use of force by the United
States, Syria has not taken any defensive actions against the United
States, 111 despite having a robust integrated air defense system.112
President Assad has also acknowledged that his government receives
information regarding U.S. airstrikes from third parties. 113 Finally,
Syria recently agreed to a cease-fire, which, by its terms, does not apply
to actions against ISIS or al-Nusra 114 despite the fact that the U.S. is
engaged in daily airstrikes against both ISIS and al-Nusra in Syria. 115 In
sum, it would seem that implied consent would be a very tenuous, but
colorable, basis for the use of force in Syria.
Sept. 17, 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/719
(Sep. 21, 2015).
110. Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the U.N., Identical letters dated
Sept. 17, 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/727
(Sep. 22, 2015).
111. Philip Ewing, Syria Could Threaten U.S. Warplanes, POLITICO (Oct. 9, 2014),
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/10/syria-united-states-warplanes-111748 (quoting U.S. Department
of Defense spokesman Rear Admiral John Kirby, “We don’t have perfect knowledge about why they
[Syria] do what they do, or why they don’t do what they don’t do. All I can tell you is their approach,
from an air defense perspective, has been passive”).
112. See Roba Alhenawi, Syria Says it Shot Down U.S. Drone, CNN (Mar. 17, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/17/middleeast/syria-us-drone/ (the only apparent action was a Syrian
claim that it shot down a U.S. drone).
113. Tom Perry, Syria Gets Information on U.S.-led Air Strikes via Iraq: Assad, REUTERS (Feb.
10,
2015),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-united-statesidUSKBN0LE0FW20150210.
114. Joint Statement of the United States and the Russian Federation, as Co-Chairs of the ISSG,
on Cessation of Hostilities in Syria, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Feb. 22, 2016),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/02/253115.htm.
115. Press Release, U.S. Cent. Command, Military Airstrikes Continue Against ISIL Terrorists in
Syria and Iraq (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.centcom.mil/news/press-release/march-3-military-airstrikescontinue-against-isil-terrorists-in-syria-and-i.
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Regardless of whether or not Syria has consented to U.S. activity on
its territory, one may ask whether or not the United States should still be
required to coordinate military actions with the Syrian government.
Indeed, the Syrian government has made statements indicating their
willingness to “cooperate and coordinate” with any State in the fight
against ISIS. 116 Claus Kreß has argued that the United States’
acceptance to intervene on behalf of a “criminal regime” such as Syria
“would amount, by virtue of the conditions attached to the invitation by
the regime, to a violation of the duty not to assist another State in the
commission of serious violations of international law, including war
crimes and actions rising to the level of crimes against humanity.” 117
This is an interesting argument that is beyond the scope of this article,
but deserve further discussion.
A final issue of consent concerns the question as to whether the
government of Syria is in fact authorized to provide consent, as opposed
to the National Coalition of Syria (or some other opposition group).
While a number of States have provided some level of recognition of the
opposition government, this recognition has been strictly political. A
government represents the State as long as it is in “effective control of
that state.” 118 This is true even in instances in which the “regime in
effective control of a state” is “not recognized by other governments.”119
A fair question, however, is whether the government of Syria is in fact
in “effective control” of the State of Syria.
It must be recognized that there exists a presumption in favor of
established governments. 120 Hersch Lauterpacht writes, “So long as the
revolution has not been fully successful, and so long as the lawful
government, however adversely affected by the fortunes of the civil war,
remains within national territory and asserts its authority, it is presumed
to represent the State as a whole.” 121 Recognition of a rebel
government—“whatever its prospects”—while a “lawful government
offers resistance which is not ostensibly hopeless or purely nominal”

116. Syria Will Help US Fight Terrorism, Says Walid Muallem, BBC NEWS (Aug. 25, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28927246 (quoting Syrian Foreign Minister Walid
Muallem: “Syria is ready to cooperate and coordinate all efforts, whether regional or international, to
combat terrorism.”).
117. Kreß, surpa note 72.
118. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 203 (AM. LAW INSTIT.1987).
119. Id.
120. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 (1947); see also Ralph
Wilde et al., Recognition of States: the Consequences of Recognition or Non-Recognition in UK and
International Law, CHATHAM HOUSE (Feb. 2010)( quoting JAMES R. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF
STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 51 (2d ed. 2006) ([T]here is a general presumption which “favours the
continuity and disfavours the extinction of an established State.”)).
121. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 120.
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constitutes premature recognition. 122 This, as Lauterpacht points out “is
a tortious act against the lawful government; it is a breach of
international law.” 123 Thus, the Assad regime is currently the legal
government of Syria and would be solely authorized to provide consent
to the use of force within Syrian territory.
c. Humanitarian Intervention
The UN Charter does not provide an express exception for the use of
force on humanitarian grounds. To the contrary, in the Nicaragua case,
the ICJ found “while the United States might form its own appraisal of
the situation as to respect for human rights in Nicaragua, the use of force
could not be the appropriate method to monitor or ensure such
respect.” 124 Yet, arguments have been made that there is an emerging
norm permitting humanitarian intervention as the basis for the use of
force. 125 The foundation of these arguments are instances of State
practice which met little international resistance, including the
Economic Community of West African States’ interventions in Liberia
and Sierra Leone and NATO’s intervention in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. 126
To the extent that one accepts the emergence of a new norm, the use
of force would likely be limited by two factors. In the first instance, the
level of suffering that forms the basis of the intervention “must be very
high before [the right] vests, generally at a level understood to involve
‘gross and systematic’ human rights violations.” 127 Secondly the use of
force would need to be limited to actions necessary to alleviate the
suffering. 128
Of all the countries participating in the conflict in Syria, only the
United Kingdom has publically invoked humanitarian intervention as
the grounds for the use of force. On August 29, 2013, the UK Prime
Minister’s Office issued a statement articulating the grounds for
humanitarian intervention in Syria. 129 Based on the use of chemical
122. Id. at 94.
123. Id. at 95.
124. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 268.
125. See generally DINSTEIN, supra note 57, at 73–75 (discussing the emerging debate on the
issue).
126. See Michael N. Schmitt, Legitimacy versus Legality Redux: Arming the Syrian Rebels, 7 J.
NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 139 (2013).
127. Id. at 151–52.
128. See, e.g., U.K. Prime Minister’s Office, Chemical Weapon Use by Syrian Regime: UK
(Aug.
29,
2013),
Government
Legal
Position,
GOV.UK
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-governmentlegal-position/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legal-position-html-version.
129. Id.
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weapons in Eastern Damascus on August 21, 2013, the statement
declares the use of force would be permitted “in order to alleviate the
scale of the overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe in Syria by
deterring and disrupting the further use of chemical weapons by the
Syrian regime.” 130 While the statement provides explicit criteria, there
is scant legal analysis. 131 Unsurprisingly, the UK has not relied on this
position. 132
B. Arming and Training Proxies
Based on publically available information, there appears to be or have
been two U.S. programs designed to train rebels in Syria, both of which
have apparently ended. 133 In the first, a covert program run by the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), trusted rebels were provided
weapons and ammunition “to help moderate rebels fight the Assad
regime.” 134 The other program, run by the Department of Defense
(DoD), was designed to train and equip rebel forces for operations
against ISIS. 135
Depending on the way the programs were administered, they may
raise two issues in international law. First, the programs may have
constituted a “use of force” within the meaning of 2(4) of the UN
Charter. 136 Secondly, the programs may implicate the principle of
130. Id.
131. Jack Goldsmith, UK Legal Position on Humanitarian Intervention in Syria, LAFARE (Aug.
29, 2013, 9:38 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/uk-legal-position-humanitarian-intervention-syria
(“The UK ‘legal position’ contains not a bit of legal analysis.”).
132. Permanent Rep. of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the U.N.,
Identical letters dated Nov. 25, 2014 from the Permanent Rep. of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2014/851 (Nov. 26, 2014) (the UK noted that it was “taking measures in
support of the collective self-defence of Iraq as part of international efforts led by the United States”);
Prime Minister David Cameron, Statement to Parliament about Iraq: Coalition Against ISIL (Sept. 26,
2014),
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm140926/debtext/1409260001.htm#1409266000252 (in testimony to Parliament on September 26, 2014, Prime Minister David
Cameron stated, “In this case it could not be clearer that we are acting at the request of a sovereign state,
and if we were to act in Syria, I believe that would be the legal basis too: collective self-defence against
ISIL which threatens Iraq.”).
133. See Tara McKelvey, Arming Syrian Rebels: Where the US Went Wrong, BBC NEWS MAG.
(Oct. 10, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-33997408; Michael D. Shear et al., Obama
Administration Ends Effort to Train Syrians to Combat ISIS, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/10/world/middleeast/pentagon-program-islamic-statesyria.html?_r=0.
134. Adam Entous, Covert CIA Mission to Arm Syrian Rebels Goes Awry, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 26,
2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/covert-cia-mission-to-arm-syrian-rebels-goes-awry-1422329582.
135. Barbara Starr et al., US Suspending Program to Train and Equip Syrian Rebels, CNN (Oct.
9, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/09/politics/us-syria-rebels-arms-program-suspended/.
136. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 228 (“[A]rming and training” rebels “can certainly be said to
involve the threat or use of force against Nicaragua.”).
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nonintervention and raise questions of State responsibility for the
actions of proxies.
1. Use of Force
With regard to the Article 2(4) issues related to arming and training
proxies, the Nicaragua court famously found that “arming and training”
rebels “can certainly be said to involve the threat or use of force against
Nicaragua.” 137 The CIA program in Syria allegedly provided small
arms, small arms ammunition, antitank missiles, and nonlethal aid
including communications equipment, food, and medical supplies.138
Furthermore, the program was run from a command center within
Syria. 139 The number of weapons provided is uncertain, but it has been
reported that the program is “significantly larger than the failed $500
million Pentagon program.” 140 If these facts are true, there can be little
question that, absent legal justification such as self-defense, the covert
CIA program violated Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. 141
The nature of the arms and training provided to rebels under the DoD
program is similar to the arms and training under the CIA program.
Unlike the CIA program (and the U.S. program addressed in the
Nicaragua case), the DoD program in Syria was not directed at the
State. Thus, arguably, the DoD program did not implicate Article 2(4)
because the use of force was not directed at a State. 142
As a threshold matter, it is not clear whether the DoD could in fact
control the ultimate use of the arms provided under the program, which
is important because, as discussed below the United States will be
responsible for violations of the law that arise from operations over
137. Id.
138. Ernesto Londoño & Greg Miller, CIA Begins Weapons Delivery to Syrian Rebels,
WASHINGTON POST (Sep. 11, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/ciabegins-weapons-delivery-to-syrian-rebels/2013/09/11/9fcf2ed8-1b0c-11e3-a6287e6dde8f889d_story.html.
139. Entous, supra note 134.
140. Anne Barnard & Karam Shoumali, U.S. Weaponry Is Turning Syria Into Proxy War With
Russia, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/13/world/middleeast/syria-russiaairstrikes.html.
141. See Schmitt, supra note 126, at 142 (“There is, therefore, little doubt that the provision of
lethal aid directly to the Syrian rebel forces would amount to a ‘use of force,’ at least by the generally
accepted standards of the ICJ set forth in Nicaragua. Absent a justification for such use, the provision
of lethal aid would violate the U.N. Charter’s prohibition on the use of force, as well as the analogous
prohibition resident in customary international law.”).
142. See generally, Interview with President Barack Obama, NBC NEWS MEET THE PRESS
September 7, 2014 (“our attitude towards Assad continues to be that you know, through his actions,
through using chemical weapons on his own people, dropping barrel bombs that killed innocent children
that he, he has foregone legitimacy. But when it comes to our policy and the coalition that we’re putting
together, our focus specifically is on ISIL.”), http://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/president-barackobamas-full-interview-nbcs-chuck-todd-n197616.
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which it exerted “effective control.” 143 It has sought to achieve certainty
in this matter through a combination of vetting, rebel assurances, and
monitoring. 144 The efficacy of this approach is questionable—a
problem that has been publically acknowledged. 145 Even assuming,
arguendo, that the provided arms and training were exclusively used
against ISIS, the program still raises the specter of a 2(4) violation,
particularly given the legislative language establishing the DoD
program. The DoD declares that the purpose of the program is
to provide assistance, including training, equipment, supplies,
sustainment and stipends, to appropriately vetted elements of the
Syrian opposition and other appropriately vetted Syrian groups or
individuals for the following purposes: defending the Syrian
people from attacks by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL), and securing territory controlled by the Syrian opposition;
protecting the United States, its friends and allies, and the Syrian
people from the threats posed by terrorists in Syria; and promoting
the conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in
Syria. 146
The directive to “secure territory” does not specify against whom that
territory is to be secured. In Syria, the opposition is just as likely to
secure territory against the Syrian government as against ISIS. Further,
the language regarding the promotion of a negotiated settlement
specifically refers to the Syrian government. It is difficult to see how
the provision of arms and training for the purpose of “promoting the
conditions for a negotiated settlement” could not implicate the use of
force against the Syrian government.
Accepting that elements of the U.S. programs violated the prohibition
on the use of force potentially triggers Syria’s right to self-defense. A
State’s right to act in self-defense arises when it has suffered an “armed
attack.” The difference in language between Article 2(4) (“use of
force”) and Article 51 (“armed attack”) has led to significant discussion
regarding the nature of this difference in terminology. The ICJ in the
143. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 115.
144. See Christopher M. Blanchard & Amy Belasco, Train and Equip Program for Syria:
Authorities, Funding, and Issues for Congress, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (Jun. 9, 2015).
145. Helen Cooper, Few U.S.-Trained Syrians Still Fight ISIS, Senator Are Told, N.Y. TIMES
(Sep. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/17/world/middleeast/isis-isil-syrians-senate-armedservices-committee.html (“Only four or five Syrian individuals trained by the United States military to
confront the Islamic State remain in the fight, the head of the United States Central Command told a
Senate panel on Wednesday, a bleak acknowledgment that the Defense Department’s $500 million
program to raise an army of Syrian fighters has gone nowhere.”).
146. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015, Pub. L. 113-235, § 9016,
128 Stat. 2130 (2014) (emphasis added).
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Nicaragua case, for example, found that some uses of force may not
constitute an attack under Article 51. 147 In a minority view, the United
States holds that there is no gap between Article 51 and 2(4), thus any
use of force would constitute an armed attack and thus trigger a right to
act in self-defense. 148 Under such a reading, the CIA program would
trigger a Syrian right to self-defense.
The more widely accepted position would hold that the U.S. actions
through the proxy program are unlikely to trigger Syria’s right to selfdefense, as they would not rise to the level of an armed attack by the
United States on Syria. Professor Schmitt, for example, has analyzed
this issue and concluded: “[E]ven if the U.S. transfer of arms to the
Syrian rebels qualifies as an unlawful use of force, Syria may not
respond in self-defense with any measures that amount to a use of
force.” 149 Rather, Syria’s recourse would be the imposition of peaceful
countermeasures, retorsions, or action through the Security Council. 150
Aside from violating Article 2(4), there also exists the issue of State
responsibility for the actions of the United States’ proxies. The court in
Nicaragua addressed this question and found that establishing
responsibility would require a determination of the level of dependence
the proxy has with respect to its sponsor. The court reasoned:
[T]he relationship of the contras to the United States Government
was so much one of dependence on the one side and control on the
other that it would be right to equate the Contras, for legal
purposes, with an organ of the United States Government, or as
acting on behalf of that Government. 151
Thus, the court imposed liability for the proxy’s actions when the
sponsoring State exerted “effective control of the operations in the
course of which the violations were committed.” 152
The degree of control exerted by the United States over proxy forces
has not, of course, been publically detailed. Looking at news reports,
congressional testimony, and public statements, one can paint a
reasonable picture of the program. Even with this limited data, the CIA
147. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 210.
148. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 87, at 47 (“The United States has long taken the
position that the inherent right of self-defense potentially applies against any illegal use of force.”).
149. Schmitt, Legitimacy, supra note 126, at 142.
150. See generally U.N. Legislative Series: Materials on the Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, ch. V, art. 22, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/25 (2012).
151. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 109.
152. Id. ¶ 115; see also Articles on Responsibility, supra note 96, at 47 (“The conduct of a person
or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of
persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying
out the conduct.”).
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program does not seem to rise to the level of “effective control.”
Proxy forces were selected in order to ensure they would operate in
accordance with U.S. policies.153 Once identified, proxy forces in Syria
would request weapons from U.S. officials, who would then allocate
resources without explanation. 154 When the program began to supply
Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) antitank
missiles, the CIA instituted certain limitations, which were reported in
the Wall Street Journal:
The CIA limited who got TOWs and how many . . . [t]rusted
commanders also were instructed to film their use of the TOWs in
battle so the CIA could monitor them and offer pointers on how to
use the missiles more effectively. Commanders got permission
later to post some of the videos online as propaganda. 155
The programs were apparently administered from an operations
center in Syria that allowed U.S. officials to field requests from their
partner forces. 156 One official familiar with the U.S. covert program
characterized the provision of arms as “tightly controlled.” 157 Effective
control requires “the State’s instructions were given, in respect of each
operation in which the alleged violations occurred.” 158 Based upon
publically available information, it does not appear that this level of
control rises to the level of effective control.
2. Principle of Nonintervention
The principle in international law against the interference in another
State’s affairs can be violated by a State absent the use of force. The
ICJ in Nicaragua found “the principle forbids all States or groups of
States to intervene directly or indirectly in internal or external affairs of
other States.” 159 The court further elaborated, noting,
A prohibited intervention must . . . bear[] on matters in which each
State is permitted . . . to decide freely. . . . Intervention is
wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such
choices, which must remain free ones. The element of coercion,
153. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 115.
154. Entous, supra note 134.
155. Entous, supra note 134.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serbia and Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43 ¶ 400 (Feb. 26, 2007).
159. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 205; see also Armed Activities, supra note 50, ¶ 205.
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which defines, and indeed forms the very essence of, prohibited
intervention, is particularly obvious in the case of an intervention
which uses force, either in the direct form of military action, or in
the indirect form of support for subversive or terrorist armed
activities within another State. 160
In Syria, the United States programs supplied nonlethal assistance in
the form of training, food, communications equipment, and medical
supplies; and lethal assistance in the form of small arms, small arms
ammunition, and TOW antitank missiles. 161 Such actions are of
precisely the nature envisioned by the Nicaragua case and prohibited by
the principle of nonintervention.
Notwithstanding the apparent
wrongfulness of these practices, there are circumstances precluding
wrongfulness which should be considered. For example, where actions
have been taken in individual or collective self-defense, such a
justification would preclude the wrongfulness of the action.
At this point, a distinction should be made between the DoD and CIA
programs. As a general principle of State responsibility, which organ of
government is taking the action is immaterial. 162 In the case at hand,
however, there is a distinction based on the purposes of the two
programs. The purpose of the DoD program is self-defense, and would
thus not violate the principle of nonintervention. The purpose of the
CIA program is to support anti-Syrian government forces and would
thus appear to violate the principle of nonintervention.
IV. JUS IN BELLO
A. Conflict Classification
The existence and nature of a given conflict governs the applicability
of law. The application of force in the various non-international armed
conflicts (NIACs) in Syria will be governed by the Law of Armed
Conflict (LOAC), customary international law, and international human
rights law (IHRL). 163 In an international armed conflict (IAC),
applicable treaty law including the 1949 Geneva Conventions in
addition to IHRL and customary international law apply. 164 In a conflict
160. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 205.
161. Londoño & Miller, supra note 138.
162. G.A. Res. 56/83, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ch. 2, art. 4 (Jan.
28, 2002) (“The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international
law . . . whatever position it holds in the organization of the State . . . .”).
163. Gill & Fleck, supra note 57, at 72.
164. Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention (II)
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below the threshold of armed conflict, only IHRL, customary
international law, and the domestic law of the State would apply. 165
1. International Armed Conflicts
The existence of an IAC is determined based on the criteria set forth
in Common Article 2, which apply the conventions “to all cases of
declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between
two or more of the High Contracting Parties.” 166 Thus, the conflict must
be (1) between two States and (2) the conflict must be “armed.”
The International Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) official
commentary to this article presents a very broad view of the Article 2
criteria, noting:
Any difference arising between two States and leading to the
intervention of armed forces is an armed conflict within the
meaning of Article 2, even if one of the Parties denies the
existence of the state of war. It makes no difference how long the
conflict lasts or how much slaughter takes place.167
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
in Tadić endorsed this view, holding that “an armed conflict exists
whenever there is a resort to armed force between States.” 168 This view
is widely, but not universally, accepted 169 and continues to be the
subject of considerable debate. 170
for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva
Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter “Common Article 2”].
165. Gill & Fleck, supra note 57, at 49 (“International humanitarian law begins to apply with the
start of an armed conflict . . . . International human rights law applies at all times.”).
166. Common Article 2, supra note 164.
167. COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION III RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS
OF WAR 23 (Jean Pictet ed., 1960) (“Any difference arising between two States and leading to the
intervention of armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even if one of the
Parties denies the existence of the state of war. It makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, or
how much slaughter takes place.”).
168. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defense Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
169. See, e.g., Final Report of the Meeting of Armed Conflict in International Law, INT’L L.
ASS’N 2 (2010) (“The Committee, however, found little evidence to support the view that the
Conventions apply in the absence of fighting of some intensity.”).
170. See, e.g., Adil Ahmad Haque, Between the Law of Force and the Law of Armed Conflict,
JUST SEC. (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/33515/law-force-law-armed-conflict/; Terry
Gill, Letter to the Editor from Professor Terry Gill on Classification of International Armed Conflict,
JUST SEC. (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/33569/letter-editor-prof-terry-gill-classification-
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In the entirety of the conflict in Syria thus far, there have been
arguably two IACs. The first likely existed between Turkey and Russia
arising from the shooting down of the Russian military jet. In this
incident, there was an unmistakable use of armed force by Turkey
against Russia, regardless of the fleeting nature of the conflict. 171
The second possible IAC occurred from the use of force against the
territory of a non-consenting State, for example, the use of force by the
U.S. and coalition partners against ISIS targets in Syrian territory. Some
have argued, persuasively in this author’s opinion, that the use of force
within the territory of a State, even if not directed at that State,
constitutes the use of force against the State. 172 This position, however,
is not universally accepted. 173
Finally, an IAC can occur through the internationalization of the
conflict. Internationalization occurs when a NIAC becomes an IAC due
to the control exerted by a State over the organized armed group that is
party to the NIAC. 174 This is generally seen to occur when States exert
“overall control” of partner forces. 175

international-armed-conflict/; Kenneth Watkin, Letter to the Editor: “Lines in the Sand”—A Reply to
Professor Haque, JUST SEC. (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/33792/letter-editor-linessand-a-reply-professor-haque/.
171. See generally CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF
8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF AUGUST 12 1949 at 40 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1988)
(“[H]umanitarian law also covers any dispute between two States involving the use of their armed
forces. Neither the duration of the conflict, nor its intensity, play a role: the law must be applied to the
fullest extent required by the situation of the persons and the objects protected by it.”).
172. See, e.g., Dapo Akande, Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 59 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst, ed., 2012) (“Most
controversy in this area centres around the cases where a foreign State fights against a non-state group in
the territorial State but without the consent of the territorial State. In the view of this author . . .in such
circumstances, there will be an armed conflict between the foreign State and the territorial State.”);
Ashley S. Deeks, Consent to the Use of Force and International Law Supremacy, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1,
13 (2013) (“U.N. Charter Article 2(4) generally is understood to preclude the use of force by one state in
another state’s territory, even if that use of force is not directed against the territorial state.”); Eugene V.
Rostow, The Legality of the International Use of Force by and from States, 10 YALE J. INT’L L. 286
(1985), http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3132&context=fss_papers (“it
could be said with confidence that states could not use force internationally to attack the territorial
integrity or political independence of other states”); Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Principles of International
Law on the Use of Force by States in Self-Defense (Chatham House, ILP WP 05/01, 2005) (“For the
purpose of Article 51, an armed attack includes not only an attack against the territory of the State,
including its airspace and territorial sea, but also attacks directed against emanations of the State, such
as its armed forces or embassies abroad.”).
173. Akande, supra note 172, at 61 (“The view that any use of force by a State on the territory of
another without the consent of the latter brings into effect an international armed conflict between the
two States has some support from scholars, though it is probably not the majority view in the existing
literature . . . .”) (citations omitted).
174. See generally Akande, supra note 172, at 57–62.
175. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 131, (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). But see Akande, supra note 172, at 57–62 (noting that
there are three approaches to characterizing when internationalization occurs).
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This level of control “must comprise more than the mere provision of
financial assistance or military equipment or training.” 176 But, it does
not go so far as to require the State to “plan all the operations of the
units dependent on them, choose their targets, or give specific
instructions concerning the conduct of military operations and any
alleged violations of international humanitarian law.” 177 Rather, the
control required is “deemed to exist when a State . . . has a role in
organising, coordinating or planning the military actions of the military
group, in addition to financing, training and equipping or providing
operational support to that group.” 178
Looking to the nature of the relationship between the United States
and rebel forces, it does not appear to rise to the level where the United
States possesses “overall control” of the rebel forces, and thus the
conflict in Syria, at least with regards to the involvement of the United
States, remains an NIAC.
2. Non-International Armed Conflicts
As with IACs, there is no codified definition of NIAC in international
law. Additional Protocol II is perhaps the natural starting point for a
conflict classification analysis for a NIAC, as the protocol exclusively
concerns NIACs. 179 Additional Protocol II, however, only assist to the
extent that it describes what does not constitute a NIAC; specifically,
“internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic
acts of violence, and other acts of a similar nature.” 180
The most widely accepted test for the existence of an NIAC comes
from the ICTY in Tadić. 181 There, the Appeals Chamber found that an
NIAC exists when there is a situation of “protracted armed violence
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or
between such groups within a State.” 182 This expression of the law has

176. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 137, (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999)
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Note, however, Additional Protocol II is not applicable to the conflict in Syria as it only
applies to certain conflicts “which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party.” Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of the 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art.1 , June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
180. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(f), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90 (NIACs exclude “situations of internal disturbance and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic
acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature.”).
181. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defense Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
182. Id. ¶ 70.
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also been adopted by the International Criminal Court. 183
This test requires, first, sufficiently intense violence. This intensity
criteria is regarded to encompass both the length of the conflict and
scale of violence. 184 Citing to Tadić, the ICTY in Haradinaj provided a
list of “indicative factors” which can be used to evaluate the intensity
criteria, including:
the number, duration and intensity of individual confrontations; the
type of weapons and other military equipment used; the number and
calibre of munitions fired; the number of persons and type of forces
partaking in the fighting; the number of casualties; the extent of
material destruction; and the number of civilians fleeing combat
zones. 185

The court further noted that “[t]he involvement of the UN Security
Council may also be a reflection of the intensity of a conflict.” 186 The
Tadić standard of intensity has been most rigorously applied to Syria by
the United Nation’s Commission of Inquiry.
The Commission’s first report addressed events in Syria from March
2011 through November 23, 2011. 187 In this time period, the
Commission “was unable to verify the level of the intensity of combat
between Syrian armed forces and other armed groups.” 188 As of the date
of the report, the Syrian government was employing large-scale military
force in coordinated operations across the country. 189 Indeed the
violence was sufficiently intense that the President of the Security
Council issued a public statement on the levels of violence, and the Arab
League suspended Syria’s membership. The Commission was also
unable to confirm a NIAC in their second report (February 22, 2012). 190
The Commission reached this conclusion despite findings on the use of
183. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(f), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90.
184. Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶ 49 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008) (“The criterion of protracted armed violence has therefore been
interpreted in practice, including by the Tadić Trial Chamber itself, as referring more to the intensity of
the armed violence than to its duration.”); see also Akande, supra note 172, at 30 (“While the word
‘protracted’ suggests that the criterion relates exclusively to the time over which armed conflict takes
place, it has come to be accepted that the key requirement here is the intensity of the force.”).
185. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, ¶ 49.
186. Id.
187. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry
on the Syrbian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/S-17/s/Add.1 (Nov. 23, 2011).
188. Id. at 18, ¶ 99.
189. Id. at 10, ¶¶ 38–39 (this included operations in Dar’a, Homs, Hama, Dayr Az Zawr,
Damascus, Alqaseer, Bab Amr, Bab Al Sibaa, Bab Hood, and Karm Al Zaitoon).
190. Report 2, supra note 8, at 6 (“While the commission is gravely concerned that the violence in
certain areas may have reached the requisite level of intensity . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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snipers, tanks, antiaircraft guns, mortars, “bombardment with heavy
weapons,” and “large-scale” army operations. 191
These are at first blush curious findings. The verbiage “unable to
verify,” however, seems to indicate their failure to find this criteria
satisfied was an evidentiary rather than factual problem. By the
Commission’s third report (August 16, 2012), it acknowledged the
requisite level of violence was met. 192
The second Tadić criterion relates to the organization element of the
parties to the conflict. By definition, at least one party to the conflict
must be a non-State armed group. In the words of Tadić, this non-State
armed group must be sufficiently organized as to constitute an
“organized armed group.” 193 This requirement has generally been read
to require “a certain level of organization with a command structure.”194
In a series of cases, the ICTY had occasion to examine the
In Haradinaj, the ICTY
organizational element from Tadić. 195
considered whether the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was an
organized armed group within the meaning articulated by Tadić. After
conducting an extensive review of ICTY case law, the court applied to
following criteria:
level of organization of the KLA: the existence of KLA headquarters
and command structure; the existence of KLA disciplinary rules and
mechanisms; territorial control exerted by the KLA; the ability of the
KLA to gain access to weapons and other military equipment; to
recruit members; to provide them with military training; to carry out
military operations and use tactics and strategy; and to speak with one
voice. 196

The first two reports of the Commission of Inquiry were focused on
the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which was the most prominent opposition
191. Id. at 10–11.
192. Report 3, supra note 8, at 1.
193. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defense Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
194. Akande, supra note 172, at 28.
195. See Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 52–59 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008) (citing Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T,
Judgment, ¶¶ 182-187 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998)); Prosecutor v.
Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, ¶¶ 23–24 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 16, 2004); Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., Case No. IT-03-66-T,
Judgement, ¶¶ 98–124 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005); Prosecutor v.
Hadžihasanović and Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47, Judgment, ¶¶ 14, 20, 23, 25 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Mar. 15, 2006); Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 41, 343
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2007); Prosecutor v. Mrkšić et al., Case No. IT95-13/1-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 39–40, 407-408 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2007).
196. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, ¶ 60.
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group at the time. Still, the Commission of Inquiry was “unable to
verify that the Free Syrian Army (FSA), local groups identifying
themselves as such or other anti-government armed groups had reached
the necessary level of organization” to trigger an NIAC under Tadić.197
As the Commission of Inquiry explained in the context of the FSA,
“there is no reliable information on the size, structure, capability and
operations of this body.” 198 By the third report (August 16, 2012) the
Commission of Inquiry found both the requisite intensity and
organization to trigger the legal threshold for an NIAC. 199
Despite the Commission’s findings, some continue to question the
nature and composition of the FSA. 200 Specifically, it is speculated that
the FSA does not possess the level of control and organization assessed
by the Commission of Inquiry or claimed publically by the FSA. 201
Given the scarcity of information coming out of Syria, it is difficult to
assess these conflicting claims. The Commission’s approach to the
FSA, however, does merit comment.
After finding the FSA sufficiently organized, the Commission has
failed to revisit the nature and organization of the group in the
intervening three years. Given the dynamic nature of the conflict, it
seems wise to occasionally revisit the conditions for the existence of the
NIAC. Furthermore, the Commission uses the term “FSA” to refer to
“any local armed group whose members identify themselves as
belonging to the FSA.” 202 This practice creates a false heuristic that
automatically equates rebel groups with the FSA.
When considering the existence and nature of NIACs in Syria, it is
197. Report 2, supra note 8, at 6.
198. Report 1, supra note 8, at 8, ¶ 29.
199. Report 3, supra note 8, at 1. The ICRC found the existence of a NIAC as of July 17, 2012;
see Syria: ICRC and Syrian Arab Red Crescent maintain aid effort amid increased fighting, ICRC
OPERATIONAL
UPDATE
(Jul.
17,
2012),
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/update/2012/syria-update-2012-07-17.htm. (“The ICRC
concludes that there is currently a non-international (internal) armed conflict occurring in Syria
opposing Government Forces and a number of organised armed opposition groups operating in several
parts of the country (including, but not limited to, Homs, Idlib and Hama).”).
200. Aron Lund, The Non-State Militant Landscape in Syria, THE CTR. FOR COMBATING
TERRORISM SENTINEL, Aug. 27, 2013, at 23, 23. (“the FSA has always been more of a brand name than
an actual organization.”). Tellingly, the Congressional Research Service fails to even mention the FSA
as one of the “Select Anti-Assad Groups” in its report to Congress. Christopher M. Blanchard et al.,
Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (Oct. 9, 2015),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33487.pdf; see also Jamie Dettmer, Shifting Allegiances, A Free-forAll in Northern Syria, VOICE AM. NEWS (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.voanews.com/a/shiftingallegiances-a-free-for-all-in-northern-syria/3194684.html; Erin Banco, Syrian Rebel Groups Merge to
Take on Assad in Dera’a, But Deep Divisions Remain, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jun. 26, 2015),
http://www.ibtimes.com/syrian-rebel-groups-merge-take-assad-deraa-deep-divisions-remain-1984616
(noting the FSA “has all but dissipated.”).
201. Lund, supra note 200.
202. Report 2, supra note 8, at 6.
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important to consider relationships between organizations. As noted
above, there are a number of groups affiliated to some degree with the
FSA. Similarly, there are groups affiliated with ISIS. Where opposition
groups are sufficiently independent from another affiliated group (e.g.,
the Jaish al Fatah as distinct from the Southern Front), and meet the
Tadić criteria, they will be engaged in their own NIAC with the Syrian
government.
Thus, the government of Syria is likely involved in individual NIACs
with ISIS, the al-Nusra Front and the Kurdish People’s Protection Units
(YPG), and a number of independent opposition groups such as Jaish al
Fatah and the Southern Front. Furthermore, many of these groups are
involved in NIACs with one another. Finally, the United States and
coalition States are engaged in NIACs against ISIS and the al-Nusra
Front in Syria. With respect to all NIACs in Syria, the conduct of
hostilities will be governed by LOAC, customary international law, and
IHRL. 203
A related issue concerns the geographic applicability of Common
Article 3 and customary LOAC in a NIAC. 204 This issue would arise in
the context of Syria where a member of ISIS leaves the region with the
intent to conduct hostilities elsewhere. 205 It is widely accepted that
LOAC is applicable within the entirety of the State engaged in the NIAC
so long as the acts are “closely related” to hostilities. 206 There is
disagreement, however, on the whether LOAC applies outside the
territory of the State in which it is occurring.
The first view holds that it does not apply outside the State regardless
of whether the conflict was fully contained within the State. 207 Under
this approach, the LOAC would be inapplicable to the traveling ISIS
fighter outside of Iraq or Syria.
203. Gill & Fleck, supra note 57, at 72; see also Derek Jinks, International Human Rights Law in
Time of Armed Conflict, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT
(Andrew Clapham & Paola Gaeta eds., 2014) (discussing the interaction between IHRL and LOAC).
204. Jelena Pejic, The Protective Scope of Common Article 3: More than Meets the Eye, 93 INT’L
REV. RED CROSS 1, 6 (2011)
205. Honorable James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, DNI Clapper Opening
Statement
on
the
Worldwide
Threat
Assessment
(Feb.
9,
2016),
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2016-02-09SASC_open_threat_hearing_transcript.pdf (ISIS has
“attempted or conducted scores of attacks outside Syria and Iraq in the past 15 months.”).
206. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defense Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 60–70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (“The
geographical and temporal frame of reference for internal armed conflicts is similarly broad . . . . It is
sufficient that the alleged crimes were closely related to the hostilities occurring in other parts of the
territories controlled by the parties to the conflict.”).
207. See generally Michael N. Schmitt, Charting the Legal Geography of Non-International
Armed Conflict, 90 INT’L L. STUDY. 1 (2014) (noting that “[s]upport for this approach is found in a plain
meaning interpretation of Common Article’s ‘in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties’
text.”). Id. at 9.
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A second approach, championed by the ICRC, argues that LOAC
“spills over” beyond the territorial borders to encompass organized
armed groups operating in border regions. 208 Thus, acts of violence
committed by a member of an organized armed group outside the
“spillover” area of the conflict would not be considered part of the
conflict and thus, LOAC and Common Article 3 would be
inapplicable. 209 Under this approach, the LOAC would be applicable to
the traveling ISIS fighter in Turkey near the Syrian border, but not
outside the border regions.
A third approach embraces the concept of a non-geography focused
NIAC in which a participant carries with them NIAC regardless of the
geographic location. 210 Under this approach, LOAC would remain
applicable to the ISIS fighter regardless of their geographic location as
long as they continue to take a direct part in hostilities. 211
B. The Conduct of Hostilities and Accountability
This section will first address the use of force by the U.S. and
partners in Syria, and the use of force by the Syrian government, ISIS,
and the Syrian opposition. The final section will briefly address
individual liability and State responsibility.
The jus in bello is anchored by the principle of distinction, which
requires parties to a conflict to distinguish between lawful targets—
combatants, military objects, and civilians engaged in direct
participation in hostilities—from unlawful targets: civilians, civilian
objects, and those hors de combat. 212 Civilians are defined as all
persons who are not members of the armed forces, 213 whereas

208. See, e.g., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE
CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS 9–11 (Oct. 2011); Pejic, supra note 204, at 6 (“[C]ertain
NIACs originating within the territory of a single state between government armed forces and one or
more organized armed groups have also been known to ‘spill over’ into the territory of neighbouring
states.”).
209. Pejic, supra note 204.
210. See generally Schmitt, Geography, supra note 207.
211. Note: this does not address the jus ad bellum issues related to targeting such an individual.
See Schmitt, Geography, supra note 207, at 17.
212. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art.57(2)(a)(1), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter “Protocol I”] (The article requires the attacker “do everything feasible to verify
that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilian nor civilian objects and are not subject to special
protection but are military objectives.”); see also id. at art. 57(b) (defining indiscriminate attacks as
those causing “incidental loss . . . which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated.”).
213. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW VOLUME 1: RULES 17, r. 5 (2005) (“Civilians are persons who are not members
of the armed forces. The civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians.”).
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combatants include: armed forces of a State; 214 members of a militia or
volunteer corps that belong to a State; 215 members of a levée en
masse, 216 and members of organized armed groups. 217 Civilians and
civilian objects are protected from attack “unless and for such time as
they take a direct part in hostilities.” 218 The requirement to distinguish
between civilians and civilians directly participating in hostilities is a
norm of customary international law and applies with equal weight to
NIACs. 219
Civilian objects have been defined by Article 52 of Additional
Protocol I, which prohibits targeting all objects that “are not military
objectives.” 220 Military objectives are those which, “by their nature,
location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military
action,” and whose “total or partial destruction, capture or
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite
military advantage.” 221
The recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan brought into stark
contrast the difficulty in defining direct participation in hostilities. This
led to a multiyear effort by the ICRC to publish interpretive guidance on
the issue. 222 The ICRC’s classification of what constitutes direct
participation in hostilities has generally found widespread support. 223
214. Protocol I, supra note 212, at art. 43(2); DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 87, ¶ 4.3.3;
see also Michael N. Schmitt & Eric W. Widmar, “On Target”: Precision and Balance in the
Contemporary Law of Targeting, 7 NAT’L. SEC. L.& POL’Y 379, 384.
215. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 87, ¶ 4.3.3; see also NILS MELZER, INT’L COMM.
OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 22 (2009) (“[A]ll armed actors showing a sufficient degree of
military organization and belonging to a party to the conflict must be regarded as part of the armed
forces of that party.”).
216. Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 4(6), Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 87, ¶ 4.3.3.
217. Schmitt & Widmar, supra note 214, at 385 (“Consensus has emerged in the past decade as to
another group of individuals who do not qualify as civilians for the purpose of targeting—members of
‘organized armed groups.’”); see also DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 87, ¶ 5.8.3 (“Like
members of an enemy State’s armed forces, individuals who are formally or functionally part of a nonState armed group that is engaged in hostilities may be made the object of attack because they likewise
share in their group’s hostile intent.”).
218. Protocol I, supra note 212, at art. 51(3).
219. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 213, at 3, r. 1 (“State practice establishes
[distinction] as a norm of customary international law applicable in both international and noninternational armed conflicts.”).
220. Protocol I, supra note 212, at art. 52(1).
221. Id. at art. 52(2); DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 87, at 206 (quoting CCW
AMENDED MINES PROTOCOL art. 2(6) (“Military objectives, insofar as objects are concerned, include
‘any object which by its nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the
time, offers a definite military advantage.’”)).
222. MELZER, supra note 215.
223. Schmitt & Widmar, supra note 214, at 387 (“The ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance, in an
approach that has been widely accepted.”).
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The report also addressed membership in an organized armed group.
Here, the ICRC’s membership criterion as those exercising a
“continuous combat function” in the group has been met with
considerably more criticism. 224
Further, the LOAC requires all attacks be proportional; that is, the
“direct military advantage anticipated” must be excessive in relation to
the expected “incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, [and]
damage to civilian objects.” 225 Finally, Article 57 of Additional
Protocol I requires all feasible precautions in the attack, including a
requirement that “constant care” be taken to “spare the civilian
population, civilians, and civilian objects.” 226
1. Syria, ISIS, and the Opposition
The violence on the part of the Syrian government, ISIS, and to some
extent, the Syrian opposition, has been particularly acute. International
organizations and NGOs have been active in documenting the atrocities
committed in the conflict. 227 The most comprehensive and independent
examination of the conduct of hostilities has been conducted by the U.N.
Independent Commission of Inquiry.
While it is beyond the scope of this article to go through all the
Commission’s findings, it is worth noting that the Commission has
documented several uses of chemical weapons, 228 snipers, 229 tanks,230
antiaircraft guns, 231 mortars, 232 thermobaric bombs, 233 “bombardment
with heavy weapons,” 234 and “large-scale” army operations. 235 They
224. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The
Constitutive Elements, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 697 (2010) (arguing that all members of an
organized armed group may be targeted regardless of their function in the group).
225. Protocol I, supra note 212, at art. 57(2)(a)(iii); see also id. at art. 51(5)(b) (“an attack which
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects,
or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated.”).
226. Protocol I, supra note 212, at art. 57(1); see also DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note
87, at 195 (“Combatants must take feasible precautions in conducting attacks to reduce the risk of harm
to civilians and other protected persons and objects.”).
227. See, e.g., Syria, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/middle-east/n-africa/syria
RIGHTS
FIRST,
(last
visited
Aug.
30,
2016);
Syrian
Refugees,
HUMAN
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/topics/syria (last visited Aug. 30, 2016); Uncovering Human Rights
,
AMNESTY
INT’L
(Oct.
23,
2015),
Abuses
in
Syria
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/10/uncovering-human-rights-abuses-in-syria/.
228. Report 5, supra note 8, at 21.
229. Id. at 10, 19.
230. Id. at 19.
231. Report 2, supra note 8, at 11.
232. Report 3, supra note 8, at 17.
233. Report 5, supra note 8, at 6.
234. Report 2, supra note 8, at 11.
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have also documented instances of siege warfare, 236 sexual violence, 237
torture, 238 the targeting of medical clinics 239 and the military occupation
of civilian objects. 240 Further, the Commission “found reasonable
grounds to believe that war crimes, including murder, extrajudicial
execution, and torture, had been perpetrated by organized antigovernment armed groups.” 241 The Commission and other groups have
also found LOAC violations committed by opposition forces. 242
2. United States
In the context of the current conflict in Syria, the majority of
questions arising from U.S. and coalition actions have concerned attacks
on objects. Specifically, questions have been raised concerning the
targeting of ISIS oil tankers 243 and the targeting of ISIS cash reserves.244
The U.S. has acknowledged striking both ISIS-controlled oil tankers245
and ISIS-controlled cash stockpiles. 246 Both sets of targets were
attacked in order to disrupt ISIS’s efforts to fund their operations. 247
Assuming—as appears the case—that the attacks otherwise complied
with the LOAC, the question is whether oil tankers and cash are military
objectives. Additional Protocol I provides useful guidance on this
235. Id. at 10–11.
236. Report 5, supra note 8, at 21.
237. Id. at 15–16; Report 3, supra note 8, at 17–18.
238. Report 5, supra note 8, at 1.
239. Report 3, supra note 8, at 20.
240. Id. at 19.
241. Id. at 2.
242. See, e.g., Report 4, supra note 8, at 52 (“Video footage of anti-Government armed groups
summarily executing captured Government soldiers and affiliated militia members, informers and
people believed to be members of the Shabbiha is publicly available.”).
243. See, e.g., Ken Watkin, Targeting “Islamic State” Oil Facilities, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 499
(2014); Beth Van Schaack, Targeting Tankers Under the Law of War (Part 1), JUST SEC. (Dec. 12,
2015) https://www.justsecurity.org/28064/targeting-tankers-law-war-part-1/.
244. See, e.g., Dalphné Richemond-Barak, Is Money a Legitimate Target? JUST SEC. (Feb. 10,
2016) https://www.justsecurity.org/29255/money-legitimate-target/.
245. Jim Miklaszewski, U.S. Destroys 280 ISIS Oil Trucks in Syrian City of Deir es-Zor, NBC
NEWS (Nov. 23, 2015) http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/u-s-destroys-280-isis-oil-truckssyrian-city-deir-n468126.
246. Barbara Starr, U.S. Bombs “Millions” in ISIS Currency Holdings, CNN (Jan. 13, 2016),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/11/politics/us-bombs-millions-isis-currency-supply/.
247. Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Warplanes Strike ISIS Oil Trucks in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/17/world/middleeast/us-strikes-syria-oil.html?_r=0.) (quoting
Colonel Steven H. Warren, Department of Defense Spokesman who said the strikes were “designed to
attack the distribution component of ISIL’s oil smuggling operation and degrade their capacity to fund
their military operations”); Luis Martinez, U.S. Airstrikes Destroy More than $500 Million in ISIS Cash
Reserves, ABC NEWS (Feb. 17, 2016), http://abcnews.go.com/International/us-airstrikes-destroy-500million-isis-cash-reserves/story?id=37010061 (“Beginning last fall, the U.S. also began targeting ISIS
‘cash distribution centers’ in Syria where ISIS stored hard cash used for its operations.”).
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question. While the United States is not party to Additional Protocol I,
174 States are, and the United States regards large portions of the
protocol as customary law. 248 Additional Protocol I defines military
objectives to include those which “by their nature, location, purpose or
use make an effective contribution to military action.” 249 The U.S. has
interpreted this to include a contribution to the “war-fighting or warsustaining capability of an opposing force.” 250 This interpretation has
been the subject of debate. 251
This article need not weigh in on the breadth of Article 52. The focus
of the inquiry here is on whether the targeted oil tankers and cash
reserves make an effective contribution to the military action of ISIS and
whether their destruction offers a definite military advantage to the
United States. Oil and cash are best categorized as military objectives
by their purpose—that is, their intended future use. 252
Determining the intended future use of an object is a precarious
exercise. As Professor Schmitt has cautioned, where “the intended
future use of an object is not perfectly clear, the attacker must act
248. See Michael J. Matheson, Remarks in Session One: The United States Position on the
Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 419 (1987).
249. Protocol I, supra note 212, at art. 52(2).
250. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 87, at 210.
251. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 57, at 95 (“An American attempt . . . to substitute the words
‘military action’ by the idiom ‘war-fighting or war-sustaining capability’ goes too far.”). The U.S. cites
historical practice as support for their position, including the Union destruction of the Confederacy’s
cotton and coalition destruction of narcotics infrastructure during the conflict in Afghanistan. DOD
LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 87, at 264. But see Ken Watkin, Targeting “Islamic State” Oil
Facilities, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 499 (2014) (noting that “a 2009 Report to the Committee on Foreign
Relations in the United States Senate indicates the authorization to use lethal force in this context in
Afghanistan caused some countries to question ‘whether the killing of traffickers and destroying drug
labs complied with international law’”) (citations omitted). Support for this position can further be
found in the ICRC’s 1956 Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian
Population in Time of War. Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian
Population in Time of War ICRC, 1956, INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/420?OpenDocument (last visited Feb. 22, 2017); MICHAEL BOTHE, KARL
JOSEPH PARTSCH & WALDEMAR A. SOLF, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 324 (1982)
(“[M]ilitary objectives include activities providing administrative and logistical support to military
operations . . . .”); W. Hays Parks, Asymmetries and the Identification of Legitimate Military Objectives,
in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW FACING NEW CHALLENGES 100 (Wolff Heintschel von
Heineff ed., 2007) (“War-sustaining and/or war-fighting reflect State practice.”); HUMANITARIAN
POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND
MISSILE WARFARE r. 23 (2013) (“Objects which may qualify as military objectives . . . include, but are
not limited to, factories, lines and means of communications (such as airfields, railway lines, roads,
bridges and tunnels); energy producing facilities; oil storage depots; transmission facilities and
equipment.”).
252. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 at 636, ¶ 2022 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno
Zimmermann eds., 1987) (“The criterion of ‘purpose’ is concerned with the intended future use of an
object, while that of ‘use’ is concerned with its present function.”).
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reasonably given the information available at the time of the strike.”253
Whether a given attack on an oil tanker or cash reserve will result in a
definite military advantage to the U.S. will depend on the details of a
given strike. If, for example, the oil was being driven directly to fuel a
piece of military hardware, then its destruction will offer a clear military
advantage. Robust intelligence on the nature of the target combined
with post-destruction analysis can help better inform targeting decisions.
The destruction of these categories of targets is complicated by the
fact that ISIS acts as a State-like entity, providing a range of noncombat
services to civilians. Identifying which portion of the cash is going to
sustain the war effort and which portion is going to construct civilian
schools would be extremely difficult. Thus, absent intelligence on the
target, it is difficult to determine the nature of the military advantage
that might be gained by the target’s destruction.
3. Accountability
a. Individual Liability
Individuals, of course, may be individually criminally liable for
violations of LOAC. 254 A number of fora are available to prosecute
violations of the LOAC, including domestic courts, ad hoc international
tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 255 hybrid tribunals such as the Extraordinary Chambers in
the Courts of Cambodia, 256 or the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Currently no tribunals are possessed of cases arising from Syria. The
most likely forum is the ICC, through jurisdiction there is not a forgone
conclusion. As opposed to many other international tribunals, the
jurisdiction of the ICC is complementary to national criminal
jurisdiction. 257 Thus, the court will only exercise jurisdiction in cases in
which the State is “unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the
investigation or prosecution.” 258
Syria, however, is not a party to the Rome Statute, thus ICC
jurisdiction over crimes committed in Syria by Syrians can only come

253. Schmitt & Widmar, supra note 214.
254. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
255. UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
http://www.icty.org/ (last visited July 2, 2016).
256. Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en (last visited
July 2, 2016).
257. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 1, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
(the jurisdiction of the ICC “shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.”).
258. Id. at art. 17
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from a referral from the Security Council. 259 At this time, a referral
appears unlikely given the close relationship between the Syrian
government and Russia. 260 Assuming the Security Council does refer
the case, there exists an open question as to whether or not the ICC
would have jurisdiction over use of chemical weapons as a stand-alone
crime. 261 The issue arises from the text of the Rome Statute and the
removal during the drafting process of explicit reference to a prohibition
on the use of chemical weapons. 262 Resolution—or even comment—on
this issue is well beyond the scope of this article.
b. State Responsibility
Beyond individual liability for violations of the LOAC, there exists
the question of attributing violations to a State. Actions may be
attributable to the State in three instances. First, when the actor is acting
as an actual or de facto State official. 263 This would not extend to an
actor’s purely private conduct, but would extend to actions taken ultra
vires. 264 Second, where the actor is in the pay, acting on direct
instructions, and under the supervision of the State with the orders to
carry out specific tasks. 265 In these circumstances, the individual acts
259. Id. at art. 13.
260. See Russia Opposes Syria Crisis War Crimes Court Referral, REUTERS (Jan. 15, 2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/syria-crisis-russia-idUSL6N0AKCNB20130115 (Russia has referred to
efforts to secure an ICC referral as “ill-timed and counterproductive”).
261. See Alex Whiting, The International Criminal Court, the Islamic State, and Chemical
Weapons, JUST SEC. (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/27359/icc-islamic-state-chemicalweapons/; Dapo Akande, Can the ICC Prosecute for Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria?, EJIL: TALK!
(Aug. 23, 2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/can-the-icc-prosecute-for-use-of-chemical-weapons-in-syria/;
Jillian Blake & Aqsa Mahmud, A Legal “Red Line”? Syria and the Use of Chemical Weapons in Civil
Conflict, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 244 (2013), http://www.uclalawreview.org/pdf/discourse/6116.pdf.
262. William A. Schabas, Chemical Weapons: Is it a Crime?, HUM. RIGHTS DOCTORATE BLOG
(Apr.
29,
2013),
http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.co.uk/2013/04/chemical-weapons-is-itcrime.html.
263. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 109, (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) (quoting Difference Relating to the Immunity from
Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, 199
I.C.J Rep. 62 (Apr. 29, 1999): “[T]he Court [in Nicaragua] clearly started from a basic assumption,
which the same Court recently defined as ‘a well-established rule of international law’ that a State incurs
responsibility for acts in breach of international obligations committed by individuals.”); Articles, supra
note 51, at art. 4, Commentary (“Where such a person acts in an apparently official capacity, or under
colour of authority, the actions in question will be attributable to the State.”).
264. Id. (“The case of purely private conduct should not be confused with that of an organ
functioning as such but acting ultra vires or in breach of the rules governing its operation. In this latter
case, the organ is nevertheless acting in the name of the State: this principle is affirmed in article 7.”).
265. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 86; Articles, supra note 51, at art. 8 (“The conduct of a person
or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of
persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying
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carried out at the supervision or direction of the State will be attributable
to the State. Finally, there are those instances in which the State
exercises effective control over a group. 266
The actions of Syrian government forces are clearly attributable to the
government of Syria. Similarly, the actions of Hezbollah in Syria are
likely attributable to Iran where there are indications that Hezbollah’s
actions in Syria are at the direction and control of Iran. 267 Violations of
LOAC committed by members of the opposition forces are unlikely
attributable to a State. As discussed above, the relationship between the
United States and their partner forces, for example, does not appear to
rise to the requisite level of control.
The relationship between the Syrian government and the Shabbiha,
however, does appear to be sufficiently close to attribute the actions of
the Shabbiha to the government of Syria. The organization by its nature
is secretive—the term “shabbiha” translates to ghost. 268 It is not
without note that the Commission of Inquiry defines government forces
to include the Shabbiha. 269 This is perhaps a reflection of the myriad of
reports that show the Shabbiha acting in conjunction with government
forces. 270 The history of the Shabbiha demonstrates the inextricable
out the conduct.”).
266. Articles, supra note 51, at art. 8.
267. The precise nature of the Iranian support and control of Hezbollah is uncertain. One report
notes the Iranian Quds Force “has coordinated with [Hezbollah] to train government and pro-Assad
forces inside Syria.” WILL FULTON ET AL., INST. FOR THE STUDY OF WAR, IRANIAN STRATEGY IN
SYRIA 21 (May 2013), http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/IranianStrategyinSyria1MAY.pdf. Another report notes that an Iranian commander “directs operations in Syria and oversees
Iranian arms shipments to Hezbollah.” SULLIVAN, supra note 41, at 14. This same report notes that
Hezbollah “coordinates closely with Syrian and Iranian commanders at the operational and strategic
level.” Id. at 23. Further, the Iranian Quds force and the Syrian “military high command operate a
headquarters in Damascus where they coordinate operations across the country. A senior Hezbollah
commander is also co-located at this headquarters . . . .” Id. at 23–24.
268. YAVUZ GUCTURK, THE LOSS OF HUMANITY: THE HUMAN RIGHTS DIMENSION OF THE CIVIL
WAR IN SYRIA 20 n. 2 (2014) (“Shabbiha literally means ghost or phantom in Arabic.”).
269. See supra note 8.
270. Report 4, supra note 8.
[The witness] related how two tanks entered her street with some 50 Shabbiha accompanying
them . . . . Government forces shelled Daraya from 20 to 24 August, after which they moved
into the town together with Shabbiha . . . . Members of the Shabbiha and possibly members of
the Iranian Republican Guard accompanied the army . . . . Reports from credible sources
suggest that Shabbiha deployed together with the army . . . . A woman from Homs described a
ground invasion by the army and Shabbiha in October 2012 . . . . A young woman from Dara’a
described “Shabbiha and security forces” invading her town on 22 November . . . . In
September, a neighbourhood in Homs was searched by Government security forces and
‘Shabbiha’ . . . . On 14 October, a mixture of Air Force Intelligence, Military Security
Intelligence and Shabbiha entered the town of Mhajjah, Dara’a . . . . In well-corroborated
accounts, the army, Air Force Intelligence, Military Intelligence and Shabbiha entered Tafas in
late November and burned multiple houses and shops.
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relationship with the Syrian government. As one author has noted,
“President Assad, and his father Hafez before him, used the Shabiha to
terrorise Syrians into obedience, brainwashing the militia into believing
the Sunni majority was their enemy.” 271 It further appears that
membership is drawn from Alawite communities and the Assad family
itself. 272 The government also allegedly supplies weapons to the
group. 273
A news article recounts a series of meetings in which “Maher alAssad, the president’s brother, planned ‘the making of the shabiha’—
and others in which they commanded it to do their ‘dirty work’ by
shooting unarmed opposition activists.” 274 This account details how the
government “appointed leaders for militias across the country; released
prisoners from ‘death row’ to join the force; and then provided the
financing and the weapons that they needed in order to act.” 275 Given
these facts, the government of Syria likely exercises effective control of
the Shabbiha militia.
C. Foreign Fighters
The issue of foreign fighters in Syria is a particularly acute problem.
There are between 3,000–13,000 fighters in Syria, which is a historically
high number of foreign fighters in a conflict. 276 The fighters come from
a diverse group of countries including Saudi Arabia, Libya, Jordan,
Lebanon, Tunisia, France, Germany, and the UK. The largest States in
Europe sending fighters (by proportion of population) are Austria,

Id. 55–119.
271. Harriet Alexander & Ruth Sherlock, The Shabiha: Inside Assad’s Death Squads, TELEGRAPH
(Jun. 2, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9307411/The-ShabihaInside-Assads-death-squads.html.
272. Syria
Unrest:
Who
are
the
Shabiha?,
BBC
(May
29,
2012),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14482968.
273. Hugh MacLeod & Annasofie Flamand, Inside Syria’s Shabiha Death Squads, TORONTO
STAR
(June
15,
2012),
https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2012/06/15/inside_syrias_shabiha_death_squads.html (recalling a
member of the Shabbiha “[p]acking up the Kalashnikovs, pistols, machine guns and grenades he said
were given to him ‘by the government’”).
274. Salwa Amor & Ruth Sherlock, How Bashar al-Assad Created the Feared Shabiha Militia:
(Mar.
23,
2014),
an
Insider
Speaks,
TELEGRAPH
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10716289/How-Bashar-al-Assad-createdthe-feared-shabiha-militia-an-insider-speaks.html.
275. Id.
276. Peter R. Neumann, Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/Iraq now Exceeds 20,000; Surpasses
Afghanistan Conflict in the 1980s, INT’L CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF RADICALIZATION AND POL. VIOLENCE
(Jan. 26, 2015), http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpassesafghanistan-conflict-1980s/.
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Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. 277
Before the attendant legal issues are addressed, it is prudent to
provide some background on the very concept of a foreign fighter. The
phenomenon emerged in the 1980s in Afghanistan, and was grounded in
the radical ideology of Abdallah Azzam. 278 There is a relative dearth of
scholarship given the relatively small scale of the phenomenon until the
recent conflict in Syria. Whereas we see an excess of 10,000 foreign
fighters in Syria, only three past conflicts have attracted more than 1,000
foreign fighters: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan, and Iraq. 279
This emerging problem has resulted in increased scholarship and a
struggle to properly define the concept. United Nations Security
Council Resolution 2178 provides that foreign fighters are “individuals
who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality
for the purpose of the perpetration, planning or preparation of, or
participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist
training, including in connection with armed conflict.” 280 This is
perhaps a sufficiently functional definition for the purposes of the
resolution, but it does not survive close scrutiny. As an initial matter,
the definition limits foreign fighters to those seeking to commit acts of
terrorism; a term that eludes definition, but most certainly would
exclude a number of those actors in Syria universally regarded as
foreign fighters. Second, the definition does not address the issue of
motivation. This is crucial, as a fighter motivated by financial
remuneration has different status under international law from a nonfinancially motivated fighter. In actuality, a foreign fighter motivated
by money is a mercenary. 281
Other organizations and scholars have proffered more realistic and
functional definitions. The Geneva Academy, for instance, adopted the
following: “A foreign fighter is an individual who leaves his or her
country of origin or habitual residence to join a non-state armed group in
an armed conflict abroad and who is primarily motivated by ideology,
religion, and/or kinship.” 282 This is in keeping with the definition
proffered by Thomas Hegghammer, a social scientist writing in
International Security, who defines a foreign fighter as an agent who (1)
has joined, and operates within the confines of, an insurgency; (2) lacks

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Id.
Hegghammer, supra note 4, at 73.
Id.
S.C. Res. 2178 (Sep. 24, 2014).
Protocol I, supra note 212, at art. 47.
Academy Briefing No. 7: Foreign Fighters under International Law 6, GENEVA ACADEMY
(Oct.
2014),
https://www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/docmanfiles/Publications/Academy%20Briefings/Foreign%20Fighters_2015_WEB.pdf.
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citizenship of the conflict state or kinship links to its warring factions;
(3) lacks affiliation to an official military organization; and (4) is
unpaid. 283 The difference between these two definitions is the element
of pay; in the Geneva Academy definition, the fighter must be
“primarily motivated by ideology, religion, and/or kinship” whereas
Hegghammer requires that the individual not be paid.
It would seem that Hegghammer is attempting to distinguish foreign
fighters from mercenaries, who, under Article 47 of Additional Protocol
I (API) must be “motivated to take part in hostilities essentially by the
desire for private gain.” 284 Both definitions above are essentially
variants on the definition of mercenary found in Article 47 of API.
Yoram Dinstein and others have highlighted the difficulty in parsing out
primary motivations from financial motivations. 285 That difficulty is no
less so with foreign fighters. The distinction is critical as mercenaries
are prohibited by international law.
Assuming foreign fighters are not mercenaries, what then is their
status under international law? Broadly, as a category they are neither
specifically prohibited nor protected. Indeed, the title “foreign fighter”
does not create any obligation or right under LOAC. The only legal
importance of being a “foreign fighter” comes from Security Council
Resolutions 2170 and 2178. Acting under Chapter VII, UNSCR 2170
“[c]alls upon all Member States to take national measures to suppress
the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to, and bring to justice, in
accordance with applicable international law.” 286 The resolution further
expresses the Security Council’s readiness “to consider listing those
recruiting for or participating in the activities of ISIL, [al-Nusra Front]
and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated
with Al-Qaida under the Al-Qaida sanctions regime, including through
financing or facilitating, for ISIL or [al-Nusra Front], of travel of
foreign terrorist fighters.” 287
Also acting under Chapter VII, UNSCR 2178 reiterates 2170’s call on
States “to cooperate in efforts to address the threat posed by foreign
terrorist fighters” and take actions to prevent “foreign terrorist fighters
from crossing their borders.” 288 Taken together, these resolutions
unquestionably recognize the threat posed by foreign fighters. They
also correctly recognize the problem of how to treat the State of origin,

283. Hegghammer, supra note 4, at 57–58.
284. Protocol I, supra note 212, at art. 47.
285. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICT 57 (2d. ed. 2010).
286. S.C. Res. 2170 (Aug. 15, 2014).
287. Id.
288. Id.
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States of transit, and the State in which the foreign fighter is fighting.
They do not, of course, change the status or provide combatant
immunity of the foreign fighter in an armed conflict.
D. Cease-Fire
A final point should be made regarding the various cease-fires and the
ongoing peace process, as both raise the prospect of an end to hostilities
and attendant questions concerning the applicability of LOAC during
the twilight of a conflict. On February 27, 2016, the first cease-fire went
into effect in Syria. 289 The terms of the cease-fire include prohibitions
on attacks and promises to allow for the provision of humanitarian
aid. 290 The agreement does not apply to attacks on ISIS or al-Nusra. 291
The cease-fire was short-lived and violence has resumed across the
country.
As a general proposition, it has been suggested that where a conflict
is no longer an IAC or NIAC, then LOAC ceases to apply. 292 This
principle makes sense, particularly when read together with a corollary
that holds a conflict ceases to be a conflict after the “close of military
operations and a general conclusion of peace.” 293 This corollary is taken
from the ICTY, which warned in the Gotovina case,
Once the law of armed conflict has become applicable, one should
not lightly conclude that its applicability ceases. Otherwise, the
participants in an armed conflict may find themselves in a
revolving door between applicability and non-applicability,
289. Joint Statement of the United States and the Russian Federation, as Co-Chairs of the ISSG,
on Cessation of Hostilities in Syria,
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Feb. 22, 2016),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/02/253115.htm.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Marko Milanovic, The End of Application of International Humanitarian Law, 96 INT’L
REV. RED CROSS 163, 170 (2014) (citing Derek Jinks, The Temporal Scope of Application of
International Humanitarian Law in Contemporary Conflicts 3 (Harvard Program on Humanitarian
Policy
and
Conflict
Research
Jan.
2003),
www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/files/publications/Session3.pdf; Jann Kleffner, Scope of Application
of International Humanitarian Law, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
(Dieter Fleck, ed., 3d ed. 2013).
293. Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), ¶ 169, (Int’l Crim.
Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 15, 2011); see also Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72,
Decision on Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (“International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such
armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is
reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment,
international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the
case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat
takes place there.”).
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leading to a considerable degree of legal uncertainty and
confusion. 294
The termination of an NIAC is, as one commentator has noted, “a
rather more difficult issue.” 295 Neither Common Article 3 nor
Additional Protocol II provide for the termination of their application.
Addressing this issue, Professor Marko Milanovic identifies two options
for gauging the end of an NIAC. In the first, the Tadić test applies
symmetrically, thus where some hostilities continue, the NIAC
continues. 296 The second approach would find an NIAC terminated
when the level of violence falls below “protracted armed violence” for
some degree of permanence and stability.
Despite the numerous cease-fires, the violence in Syria has continued
to a significant degree with regard to all NIACs. 297 Thus, regardless of
the approach one adopts, as of the time of writing, LOAC continues to
apply to all NIACs in Syria. Determining when a given NIAC in Syria
has ended will have to be considered on an ad hoc basis for each NIAC.
Thus, it is possible that a cease-fire could lead to protracted peace
between the Syrian government and all Syrian opposition forces, which
would end the NIAC between those groups, but would have no impact
on, the continuing NIAC between Syria and ISIS.
V. CONCLUSION
The conflict in Syria is not an aberration. Rather, it is likely a
prototype for the future: conflicts driven by some combination of
sectarian, tribal, or ethnic divisions and fueled by proxy involvement.
The issues of international law presented by such conflicts are
significant and complex. One might view the conflict in Syria and
reasonably conclude such conflicts are sufficiently novel and complex
so as to render impossible the object and purpose of LOAC.
I do not believe that to be the case. The conflict in Syria highlights
many of the ongoing debates in international law: the legitimacy of
humanitarian intervention as grounds for the use of force; the alleged
gap between Article 2(4) and Article 51 of Additional Protocol I; the
geographic scope of the applicability of LOAC; self-defense against a
294. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), ¶ 169.
295. SANDESH SIVAKUMARAN, THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 252 (2012).
296. Milanovic, supra note 292, at 179.
297. See, e.g., Claims of Violations Test Syria’s Fragile Truce, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 28, 2016),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/claims-violations-test-syria-conditional-truce160228165404818.html; Russia Says Registered Eight Syria Ceasefire Violations in Last 24 Hours,
(Mar.
7,
2016),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-violationsREUTERS
idUSKCN0W91PF.
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non-State actor; and the legitimacy of targeting war-sustaining objects.
The very fact that the Syrian conflict highlights so many fault lines
indicates the law is applicable, though its application is, at times,
uncertain. The Syrian conflict provides an opportunity to better
understand these lacunae and continually seek to strengthen the
framework of applicable law.
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